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Constrained housing supply coupled with rapid urbanisation and a volatile domestic 
credit market have put affordable rental housing development under the spotlight. 
Addressing this demands appropriate and deliberate capital provisions to induce the 
property development market to deliver the scale needed to tackle the supply-side of 
the problem. Inducements are needed for residential property developers to choose to 
develop high-density affordable rental housing on land that presents great accessibility 
to economically vibrant nodes, where land is priced at a premium. The greenfield 
residential property development space is in need of sophisticated and specific funding 
interventions to evolve it beyond the sporadic developments we observe located on the 
urban periphery on cheap land. The benefits of sophisticated funding models in 
commercial property have seen the widespread proliferation of building and 
investment activity. Rental housing, however, lags behind owing to an immature market, 
shallow investment analysis and rudimentary risk-weighted debt-funding solutions. 
These funding instruments impede developers building affordable housing schemes on 
well-located parcels of land near existing amenities and profoundly incorporate green 
technology into buildings. This research presents a proof of concept for a sophisticated 
model for high-density housing. A largely ‘spatial economic’ model for risk analysis, it is 
developed to attain a so-called Probability of Default Ratio (“PDR”) by coalescing two 
formulae regarded as international best-practice: The risk types incorporated into the 
model are (1) borrower-level credit risk, (2) property/development-level risk, and (3) 
cash-flow risk factors.   
The research is proof of concept of a credit risk management tool for impact investment 
funding model using these formulae and Geographic Information Systems (“GIS”). It 
calculates the extent of credit risk for income-producing real estate fundamentals and 
uses endogenous factors- risk factors and drivers associated with the housing scheme 
to be build and the surrounding area it is to be built in. The study area covers the 336 
contiguous municipal wards that make up the Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni 
metropolitan municipalities.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Agglomeration The act of assembling a mass of a particular thing/facet - in the case 
of this research, the assembly of businesses and people in a particular 
locale. 
Agglomeration An economic theory that proposes benefits to be derived from 
Economies businesses of people assembling near each other. 
Basel IRB approach A measure that allows banks to use their own estimated risk 
parameters for the calculating regulatory capital for credit risk and 
exposures. It allows only certain banks, those with approval from 
their Central Banks for meeting certain minimum conditions, 
disclosure requirements to use it. 
Bulk services Physical civilian infrastructure provided by a local authority such as 
roads, refuse removal, sewerage, storm-water, electrical and water 
reticulation 
GIS Geographic Information System: a cadastral completed using 
computer software 
Greenfield The construction or erection of a new structure on a site which was 
previously vacant 
Impact Investing Investments intended to create a positive impact beyond financial 
return. Many transactions take the form of private equity, debt 
investments, guarantees or collateral undertakings. 
NHBRC National Home Builder’s Registration Council- a statutory agency of 
the National Department of Human Settlements that sets norms and 
standards for construction of residential property and enforce the 
SANS 10400 building codes and regulations to govern standard of 
constructing new homes. 
Obligor The party ultimately responsible for the debt incurred- this may be 
the group holding company, “key-man”, or transaction underwriter 
Origination Fee A fee a bank may levy to a debtor upon the commencement of a new 
loan 
PDR “Probability of Default Ratio” is the percentage probability of a 
borrower entity to produce a default event as perceived by the lender 
over a specified period of time, typically one year. The PD is most 
often stated for a future period beginning immediately, but can also 
be expressed as a forward default probability beginning in one year 
for one year 
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Polycentric An area or region with many central nodes of high economic activity  
SRI Socially Responsible Investing: A subset of impact investing where 
investors seek transactions that minimize negative societal impact (of 
already precarious industries/practices) rather than proactively 
create positive impact. 
Urban Edge The semi-fixed municipal boundary established to allow no further 
municipal services to be built/supplied, except for services to 
agricultural land and therefore also the spatial limit whereby no new 
erven or townships will be proclaimed. 
UrbanSim A sophisticated spatial econometric model for simulating potential 
outcomes for key decisions and policy choices for households and 
businesses, and development choices of property developers 
Zoning The real rights, vis-à-vis permissible land use, that a parcel of urban 
land has been granted by the relevant local authority 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
“On 27 June 1975 one single whale saved by Greenpeace was, factually, one single 
whale, but the action was about whales and, by extension, whale catching as such. Even 
more, it was about our relationship with animals and the planet as a whole”. Like 
Greenpeace in its best days Social Banks 1  are competing for symbolic worldview 
supremacy in their field. These banks are able to deploy capital to endeavours that 
strengthen their beliefs and ideologies”  (Benedikter 2011, p.3) 
 
Financial institutions in South Africa, those with commercial and developmental aspirations, 
provide the impetus that promotes or hinders the reengineering of the spatial distribution. 
It is exactly how and where they deploy their capital that reinforces or changes the status quo 
and, by extension, the potential to defeat the scourge of racial and class segregation. They 
can create urban plural metropolises that are not only diverse in their housing mix, but that 
seek to find efficiency in current and future spatial planning and resource allocation. The 
working class must have a wider array of housing options located in and near the economic 
cores of a city or region and economic incentives that make affordable housing feasible in 
the short and medium term must emerge. Failure to radically address the lack of inclusive 
and diverse neighbourhoods in and near the urban cores will mean that defeating apartheid 
spatial planning will remain an unaccomplished goal.  
 
Professor David Harvey, the renowned economic author and scholar, in a July 2015 public 
lecture in London titled “Slums and Skyscrapers” said that in this neoliberal world, where 
urbanisation occurs at an unprecedented rate, we develop cities for people to invest in, and 
not for people to live in. He further stated that there exists a crisis of affordable housing at 
the very same time upper-end apartments were built and lay largely vacant because wealthy 
people such upper-end apartments as speculate investments and nothing more. 
Furthermore, he suggests that the best way to launder money from one part of the world to 
                                                   
1 Also called development banks in the Southern Africa context. 
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another is to “invest” in property market. This unabated promotion of the speculative 
property market has come at a direct cost to the working class, creating a serious scarcity in 
their end of the housing market. This is urbanisation of a subversive sort and not broad-
based development and growth as it comes part-and-parcel with displacement of people and 
entrenches the relegation of the working class and the proletariat to the urban edge. 
 
Urban land economics asserts that lower rents for those living further away from the CBD 
are directly offset by the time and costs associated with lengthier commuting (Duranton & 
Puga 2004). In case of most major cities or regions around the world, there is a perennial 
premium attached to centrally located land and it has become a globally accepted practice in 
residential property markets that land that exhibits this price premium (higher land rent), 
should be on-sold or developed for the benefit of affluent users with a higher indifference 
curve and therefore higher budget constraint. This is the backbone of entrenched inequality. 
 
Over the last two decades, South Africa’s three biggest metropoles have seen vacant land 
command prices largely only afforded by the affluent. This is most notable in the northern 
suburbs of Johannesburg and Durban, the suburbs of Pretoria East and indeed all of the 
surrounding neighbourhoods of the Cape Town CBD. The middle to ‘lower-middle’ income 
groups have been largely relegated to finding new housing stock close to the urban edges or 
in excessively congested neighbourhoods that, although not far in terms of physical distance 
from the economic centers, are by virtue of the over-reliance on private transport and an 
under-capacitated road network in reality hours away from work.  
 
With the level of speculative investment activity nowhere near any other major global city, 
we still face, albeit on a smaller scale, the scourge identified by Professor Harvey(2015), 
namely that the upper-end of the housing market serves as a vessel to house and grow 
private wealth and possibly launder money. This exclusionary and divisive growth in the 
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housing market spells trouble for a country in transition such as ours; especially given the 
waning status of the rainbow nation2 we professed to be creating only two decades ago. 
 
1.2 Research Area 
In 2014, the acceptable definition of a low-income worker or household was one where the 
nominal household income was between R3,500 and R15,000 per month. The national 
Department of Human Settlements’ defines of affordable housing as a single dwelling unit 
(freehold or sectional title) with a selling price of between R350,000 and R500,000 and the 
intended target markets are households with a gross income ranging from R9,000 to 
R15,000 per month. In the previous year, the proportion of houses registered in the national 
Deeds Registry with a selling price of below R500,000 was 58%. With respect to rental 
housing the broad definition in the national Human Settlements department in 2015 was a 
residential unit with a nominal gross rental of no more that R6,500 per month. 
 
How and where people live in relation to their jobs, place of study/instruction and amenities 
their households need is at the core of creating and maintaining wellbeing in communities, 
particularly in the racially fragmented and unequal urbanised communities of South Africa. 
At what cost are we ignoring not only the crippling inequality, but the ills directly 
attributable to urban migration, urban decay and urbanisation? How can we continue to live 
with the unacceptable levels of economic mobility of historically disadvantaged persons?  
Bearing in mind South Africa’s shambolic public transport system, can we afford to continue 
to relegate the working class to the urban periphery where the social costs of creating 
adequately resourced communities is possibly greater than a solution that integrates them 
closer to the core? 
 
When Old Mutual Ltd. launched its R7.2 billion Housing Impact Fund (“HIFSA”) in 2011, 
through its alternative investments division, the estimated national shortfall in the 
affordable/gap market was estimated at 650,000 housing units; with over 50% of that 
                                                   
2 A term coined by Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu in the mid-90s to describe the multiracial and united 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
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demand coming from Gauteng. In 2014, it was estimated that this growing demand had 
edged to 1 million housing units but that only an estimated 20,000 units were being built per 
year- with 75% or more of that new supply being built in Gauteng (Gauteng Department of 
Human Settlements, 2013).  To rethink and subsequently re-engineer the spatial distribution 
in South Africa in such a way that it no longer favours racial and income segregation and 
isolation is paramount if we wish to become a harmonious and equitable society. We may be 
free from the ravages of legislative inequality, which were the hallmark of our society under 
apartheid, but the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis3, first published in 1968, and concretized in 
South Africa by discriminatory apartheid laws is a barrier to economic growth that continues 
to haunt our democratic dispensation. This is as true now for most Historically 
Disadvantaged Persons (“HDPs”) as it was almost 50 years ago for USA’s urban black 
population. If we are able to accomplish sweeping positive changes in where and how the 
working class live, we can begin to see inclusive economic growth as an attainable goal.  The 
research aims to address the existing gap in these very issues. It does by developing a model 
that would allow funding of affordable housing in well-located sites, thus enabling the 
marginalised working class to succeed in finding better places to live.  
 
The Gauteng Department of Human Settlements’ 2015 Strategic Directive lists eight strategic 
goals for itself, the first and arguably most paramount being to “build inclusive human 
settlements consistent with integrated, efficient and equitable spatial patterns”. The 
department cites land acquisition as being the biggest hurdle, greater cooperation is needed 
between provincial and municipal authorities overcome this hurdle.  
 
The successful implementation of private sector financing interventions, which are 
profitable for residential property developers and financiers, lies at the core in aiding the 
achievement of far-reaching public benefits. It also makes the work of provincial and local 
                                                   
3 Serious limitations on black residential choice, combined with the steady dispersal of jobs from central cities 
to suburbs, are responsible for the low rates of employment and low earnings of Afro-American workers (Kain, 
J.F, 1968. "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization." 
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government easier as private developers become trailblazers in leading the charge for 
financially feasible inclusive housing (Gauteng Dept. of Human Settlements, 2013 & 2015). 
 
Major strides have been made by local commercial banks and, of late, private equity 
investment firms in funding the development of affordable high-density housing schemes. 
This has seen a strong rise in supply, albeit from a very low base. The new affordable housing 
stock is, however, overwhelmingly located in the periphery of the city, where the level of 
existing infrastructure and community services is underdeveloped.  
 
The major drawback to erecting well-located housing schemes is the effect that higher land 
prices in desirable nodes have on the feasibility of affordable housing over conventional 
housing schemes aimed at the upper-middle income group. This ‘problem’ could, however, 
be overcome by lowering barriers attributed to the long-term finance of such schemes. 
 
The residential property development market believes that greater returns lie in developing 
more upmarket housing, this for a narrow affluent market, rather than for a buoyant 
working-class market; a driving factor is the underdeveloped credit market for financing 
affordable housing.  Opting for the conventional residential market means utilising more 
capital to build homes of a higher specification and incredibly costly finishes and materials 
for affluent residential owners who appear, to a large extent, to use these properties for 
investment purposes, rather than to live in them. Catering to the affordable housing market 
demands lower building specifications and finishes, and therefore less capital outlay to 
complete a project, therefore a lower debt commitment- all in servicing a wider and more 
buoyant market. Quality4, as the building regulations and standards, must be maintained but 
the market is one where nominal incomes are largely limited to R20,000 per month per dual-
income household.  This low-to-middle income market constitutes the vast majority of the 
commuting public in any given Metro and the peak hour commute strains the road network, 
not only for them but for other road users as well.   
 
                                                   
4 Quality- suitability for intended use. 
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The current trend towards the development of high-density affordable housing largely 
supports the foundations of apartheid spatial planning (discussed in the literature review) 
as housing schemes are built along the same sparsely accessible road networks in the 
peripheral neighbourhoods. This has continued almost entirely unabated in South Africa and 
for “good” economic considerations - the continuing development of a city is driven by a two-
factor mechanism, namely a coherent city/municipal spatial planning policy and competitive 
profit-maximising. Property developers are currently not incentivised to explore affordable 
housing developments in centrally located parcels of appropriately zoned land and therefore 
very few such affordable housing schemes exist. A fundamentally neoliberal approach is 
required to change the outcomes of our current spatial patterns, insofar as they pertain to 
income/wealth and racial segregation. Impact investments will play a key role in 
deliberately augmenting the spatial distribution in major cities in South Africa. We have seen 
the mobilization of billions of Rands by the private sector and the crowding in of public funds 
too to invest high-density property developments in the rapidly urbanizing Gauteng and 
Western Cape Provinces. The funds, however, could be deployed in arguably smarter ways 
to ensure they create maximum social and environmental impact. 
 
Financial incentives by way of concessionary development funding afforded to property 
developers who wish to erect an affordable housing scheme will directly impact on the 
nature of developments (and target markets) for land that municipalities have granted high-
density residential rights. This concessionary finance is available from funders who pursue 
triple bottom line profits5. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
Competing affordable housing developers have insufficient institutional funding support, 
and more specifically access to concessionary finance from so-called triple bottom line 
                                                   
5 The triple bottom line is best described by Benedikter (2011) as ”a valid measurement” for fulfilling the core 
business mandate of pursuing or advancing: 
• Profit-economic rationality. Instances of losses or loss-leading transactions that threaten the development 
or sustainability of financier have to be avoided. 
• Environment-Natural habitat protection and sustainable handling of resources 
• People - the primacy of the community and the balanced advancement of society as a whole. 
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financiers to feasibly develop high-density affordable rental schemes in well-located and 
available land parcels in the Gauteng City-Region6 (“GCR”). This lack of support partially 
emanates from insufficient investment screening tools and subsequent reporting for the 
funding of these developments; this leaves developers little choice outside of foregoing the 
land purchase, or, purchasing the land and developing a more upmarket residential scheme.  
 
The greater level of social impact is seemingly either unrelated or poorly correlated to the 
location of proposed rental housing schemes. The correlation seems evident – even though 
it may be anecdotal – that the better placed the housing scheme the higher the level of 
occupancy will be. It is also evident that there are enhanced levels of benefits to be derived 
by prospective tenants as centrally located rental housing schemes are closer to social 
amenities. Occupants enjoy a better level of physical infrastructure and ameliorate the time 
and cost of commuting. 
 
There is adequate liquidity in affordable housing development finance in Gauteng and there 
is a solid supply of suitable land to build such housing schemes, but in the absence of 
concessionary funding developers won’t or can’t build new affordable housing. Rather, 
developers build for a more affluent target market in order to make or meet their hurdle 
rates of return. It may be that insufficient tools exist to screen and analyze social impact and 
credit risk associated with funding such developments or that the relationship between 
greater social benefit and lesser finance costs has not been adequately examined. 
 
As interest in socially responsible investment grows, so does the potential liquidity. Better 
metrics should emerge for measuring, at the very least, primary or even predetermined 
social impact to credibly justify progressively concessionary funding as social benefits have 
                                                   
6 The GCR includes a cluster of cities, towns and urban nodes. It incorporates Gauteng province in its entirety, 
with its three large metropolitan municipalities (metros) and a range of smaller urban centers that spread out 
across and beyond the provincial boundary of Gauteng to neighbouring regions characterized by several urban 
and industrial centers: Rustenburg in the north-west, Sasolburg to the south, to the south-west a handful of 
gold-mining towns (such as Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp) and to the east medium-sized towns, Middleburg 
and Secunda, “to create an almost continuous urban agglomeration.” (Wray, 2010, p.39). While it has no official 
border nor legislative or dedicated administrative political agency, it represents a coherent economic and 
geographic space (Wray 2010) within which regional competitiveness may be harnessed (OECD, 2011) 
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been difficult to value, measure and compare in the past. In addition, the process of tracking 
and measuring these social returns has been costly in terms of time and other resources 
(Wilson et al. 2015, citing OECD, p. 116). 
 
1.4 Purpose and significance of the Research 
The existing measures and projects from Government to address housing market 
mismatches and apartheid spatial planning could be described as “ineffective” at best; they 
do little to attract the interest of private residential property developers and as such leave 
Gauteng, which has a recently estimated population of 13.2 million people. Gauteng faces the 
perilous situation of being confined to the prevailing spatial and income distribution, while 
it grows at such a rate that the population is expected to double by 2055. (Mubiwa & Annegarn 
2013). With new low-cost and affordable housing being delivered at a yearly average that 
exceeds 50,000 units per annum in Johannesburg alone, the local government’s lower-level 
estimate of new households needing houses is estimated to reach 400,000 by 2030, while 
the upper-band estimation is one million. According to various observers the 2011 Census 
data indicates that this is a potentially significant under-estimation indicating just how far 
demand could outstrip supply (Wray et al. 2013).  
 
Property developers constantly change the physical landscape and as such are instrumental 
in how spatial distribution evolves. The level of financial incentive for mass housing 
developers should change if we wish to see a spatial centralizing of working class housing. 
Very few inroads will be made in creating inclusive and diverse neighbourhoods if optimally-
located residential land cannot, in any reasonable way, be converted to affordable housing. 
Such a situation will result in the concretizing of the existing critical mass of working class 
that work in Gauteng’s metropolises living on the periphery — with many in decaying 
neighbourhoods and areas of concentrated poverty.  
 
In adopting a neoliberal outlook, we would expect to see the greatest level of housing 
development activity in profit-maximising nodes amid being guided by the concentric zone 
model [Burgess Model 1925]. Urban land-use theories suggest that more centrally — and 
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therefore optimally — located land would command the higher economic rent. The research 
contends that in a post-apartheid South African city, affordable housing is able to be 
profitably built on such optimally located land parcels provided the land’s economic rent 
would be offset by the extent of concessionary funding granted to finance such affordable 
housing. The basis for offering such concessionary funding would be based on the social 
impact of a proposed development, chiefly that of building new working-class housing 
inward of the commuter zone.   In the case of urban spatial structure, we have observed good 
private sector uptake in urban regeneration projects and industrial development zones, both 
largely due to indirect interventions such as tax relief for investors. By changing the 
incentives and allowing market players to change their actions and practices to take 
advantage of the incentives a city or region can induce the particular outcome which leads 
to the intervention. 
 
This research develops a tool to further close this ‘measurement gap’, this by identifying and 
classifying the credit risk inherent in advancing loans to affordable rental housing, arguably 
the biggest sector globally to attract impact investment capital. The formula derived by the 
research, is intended for use by non-bank senior secured debt financiers- such as private 
equity funds, development finance institutions and specialised lenders. It is anticipated to be 
the foundation of an optimal funding rate [interest and upfront financing fees] model for 
lenders whose respective investment mandates allow direct investment in affordable 
housing rental stock in pursuit of seek triple bottom line gains. Cumulative causation, insofar 
as it could pertain to catalysing inclusive housing, is anticipated to drive the further benefits 
of not only inclusive working-class housing, but also the impact of this particular framework 
(derived through this research) (Duranton & Puga 2004, p. 2077). 
 
If we begin building a model for high-density affordable housing by postulating an aggregate 
triple-bottom line function with increasing marginal social returns for more favourable land, 
we limit the outcome of the research. If instead we derive this aggregate triple-bottom line 
function from first principles, we may likely observe that its efficiency can be improved upon 
by back-testing curated data and incorporating more sophisticated quantitative techniques 
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to measuring not only the total counterparty risk we endeavour to manage, but also the 
forecasted triple bottom line profits. 
 
The basis of this study, then, is to create credit risk assessment tool for a best-in-class 
selection basis to assess the microeconomic risks in undertaking to fund a high-density 
rental housing scheme. This is the model developed by the research.  The credit risk 
assessment tool is aimed at lowering the average funding rate for proposed high-density 
housing schemes by incorporating a property developer’s experience and financial standings 
with the area-specific risks of the proposed location. By locating their developments in close 
proximity to economic centers or employment nodes, the developers could achieve a funding 
(interest) rate low enough to absorb the premium paid for the well-located parcel of land 
(based on bid-rent theory). This premium in land price would have otherwise been passed 
on to the end user by means of higher rental, possibly making it unaffordable. The research 
endeavours to create a quantifiably sound model for use in a polycentric city-region 
ultimately providing a guide-price for debt funding on new developments undertaken in the 
study area. 
1.5 Research Questions 
Is the location of a new high-density affordable housing development – and the 
characteristics of its neighbourhood – able to be the significant factors for best-in-class 
screening in impact investment? 
1. Can the principles of the Basel II Capital Accord7’s Foundation IRB Approach be used as 
the basis for creating a non-bank credit assessment model of impact investors? 
2. Can the probability of possible default on a secured senior debt loan be reduced based on 
(a) the quality and desirability of the specific location that the development will be built 
on, (b) the financial standing of the developer and (c) the developer’s capability? 
3. Can a spatially aware best-in-class impact investment credit risk assessment model be 
developed for high-density affordable housing in the Metropolitan areas of Gauteng? 
                                                   
7 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004): International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards - A Revised Framework. 
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1.6 Objectives of the Research  
To establish proof of concept for a reduced form credit analysis model. The model employed 
a best-in-class impact investment screening methodology for affordable housing financiers 
(non-bank) by means of: 
1. Forming a multilayered cadastral tool for determining endogenous property-related risk 
for affordable housing impact finance/investment. 
2.  Establishing a multifactor credit risk-forecasting model for future use by impact 
investors in affordable housing. Model validated using Spearman’s rank order correlation 
of ρ≥0.5 in relation to aggregated credit expert panel ranking opinions.  Ranking done on 
the basis of trade-offs between industry-wide expert-level credit analysis and the social 
impact of proposed affordable housing rental apartment block (simulated sample data). 
3. To advance the economic rationale, both at micro and macro/meso-level of inclusive 
affordable high-density housing. 
 
1.7 Research Hypothesis 
If the correlation is equal or below 0.5, then there is limited or no consensus between the 
experts and the data would not be sufficiently valid (data validity) to infer consensus. 
Alternatively, if the correlation is more than 0.5, then there is consensus between the experts 
and the data would be sufficiently valid to infer consensus.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Research 
The study will critically review literature on the economics of housing delivery, land use and 
urbanisation to lay a theoretical basis for developing the credit risk assessment tool. 
 
The research methodology will stablish the ideological framework of the experimental 
research to be undertaken and expand upon the analytical techniques and tools used to 
develop the credit risk model’s specifications. 
The data analysis will methodically set out to attain proof of concept for the tool deduced by 
the research and evaluate the outcomes of the pilot study conducted. The conclusion will 
summarize the research findings and articulate areas of further study. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature in four broad areas that are useful for this study. Firstly,  it 
reviews the benefits attainable by society when inclusive housing policies and patterns. It 
shows how impact investing could, as a developing nation, be used to engineer that ideal 
societal outcome. It then provides the theoretical underpinnings of inclusive population 
distribution.  Secondly, it examines the empirical literature on the subject of impact 
investment in developing and developed nations with particular emphasis on peoples 
regarded as the base of the pyramid in society, that is, those most marginalised and 
vulnerable to economic shocks. Thirdly, it then delves into working class agglomeration and 
the spatial distribution of the Gauteng province. Lastly, it reviews modeling architecture 
available for affordable housing financing and risk management. 
 
2.2 Societal Benefits for Advancement of Inclusive Affordable Housing 
Throughout the last half a decade housing policy in OECD countries, with a particular 
emphasis on the USA, has been subjected to and guided by a plethora of research linking 
projects designated for low income earners with social ills relating to concentrated poverty, 
racial segregation and hindrances to economic opportunity and mobility. Many countries, 
where this research had been conducted, have experienced a far less precarious history of 
race relations than South Africa, yet the problems of concentrated poverty, racial segregation 
and hindrances to economic opportunity and mobility still existed and persisted; these are 
discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
2.2.1 Inclusive Housing and urban agglomeration  
A local researcher Jacobus (2015) suggests that inclusionary housing offers one of the only 
effective strategies for overcoming economic segregation and building sustainable and 
diverse communities. Furthermore, the evidence he observed suggests that economic 
integration is an important way to combat the negative effects of generational poverty. 
According to him, this economic integration would be achieved through a more even and 
representative distribution of employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. Lastly, he 
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asserts that integration across neighbourhoods and regions would create benefits for 
residents across all income levels. These would include: reducing sprawl (and the associated 
costs for taxpayers), living in more sustainable cities; and experiencing cultural, racial, and 
economic diversity.  Beyond Jacobus’s observations such measures would, in the short-to-
medium term, give rise to greater optimization of existing public infrastructure and lead to 
coherent planning and the optimized and unbiased allocation of public funds and resources. 
 
It is understood that land, which enjoys closer proximity and accessibility to economic 
activity and amenities, enjoys higher land rent and therefore higher potential selling prices. 
However, the preceding statement holds insofar as the land does not have materially adverse 
characteristics such as poor ground/soil conditions, being excessively undulating or being 
close to noxious/hazardous industries or sources of noise pollution (Alonso 1964; Fujita et 
al. 1999). The above forms the bedrock of William Alonso’s seminal work that was based on 
a monocentric city with one CBD. These foundations have endured in spite of the evolution 
of a contemporary “city” as we know it today, with its various CBDs that typically have their 
own specialization or characteristics. The core of Alonso’s theory has therefore become 
outmoded by a more dynamic and multi-node city structure which has come to be known as 
the polycentric city and its foremost proponent is arguably Masahisa Fujita whose work 
enjoyed many iterations and modifications.   
 
Duranton and Puga (2004) posit that land near an economic hub is not only more expensive, 
but also smaller and typically more land-intensive (higher average density). There is 
voluminous literature analysing the sorting of housing across neighbourhoods which 
considers how income affects the appraisal of (a) land, (b) leisure foregone in commuting 
and (c) access to amenities, all of which contribute to determining residential location (p. 
2072). The remaining challenge in South Africa is; how do we bring in the marginalised to 
take part in the mainstream economy? How do we afford their children and future 
generations the benefits of urban life and modern social and educational infrastructure so 
that they can one day become competent global citizens who work in and own competitive 
business that contribute to the nation? 
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With reference to areas where speculative investment capital is awash, such as the Menlyn 
and the Sandton-to-Rosebank business nodes (two urban regions that have become 
favourably consolidated into high-end service and retail nodes) the jobs offered in such 
nodes are likened to what Harvey (1989) describes as service jobs. The bulk of these jobs are 
low-paying administrative and service jobs, with a few highly paying managerial spectrum. 
The latter are exponentially fewer and particularly in South Africa a genuine middle class in 
these metropoles is so small; it has almost come to be a “missing middle” as their lifestyles 
are largely fueled by credit.  
 
If living in the core of the city is the preserve of only in the investor class (of which there are 
very few) and the majority of workers in an urban business node are classified as the 
working class (e.g., clerical, cleaning and security) and middle-income earners (skilled 
and/or professional), then they become further victimized by the success of the wealthy and 
the growth of their local economy. This is due to a multitude of reasons: they earn enough to 
keep up with inflation, thus failing to save; they own assets that are difficult to leverage for 
investment purposes; their earnings are eroded by their high indebtedness in increasingly 
volatile credit markets; and they bear the brunt of irrational and volatile commuting costs. 
All the while property priced in better located areas are rising faster than their incomes, thus 
widening the gap between where they are and where they wish to be.  
  
Meeting the steep demand for housing by providing a wider variety of housing options for 
the urban working class tantamount to an enrichment of spatial alternatives — this 
enrichment is enjoyed by a whole community or city. Better housing options would serve to 
improve the well-being of “home-seeking” families in the short-term and drastically improve 
the prospects for economic self-sufficiency and mobility in the long-term by enhancing their 
access to employment information networks. Better housing options also provide access to 
better education and training by virtue of greater proximity and near-perennial exposure to, 
and reinforcement of, social norms that encourage and reward education and employment. 




There are benefits to be derived in inclusive community building from a learning and 
knowledge perspective; in a broad sense (encompassing schooling, training, and research). 
This is not only a very important activity both in terms of the resources devoted to it, but 
also in terms of its direct and indirect contribution to societal and economic development. 
When coupled with success in well integrated urban regions, inclusive housing can unlock a 
wider spectrum from which innovation can flourish. Numerous authors, including Duranton 
and Puga (2004), have stressed how the environment offered by cities improves the 
prospects for generating new ideas. 
 
A fundamental characteristic of learning is that it seldom takes place in isolation and grows 
in reach because of social interaction among peers. This could be as complex as the transfer 
of breakthroughs or advanced technologies and ideas or as simple as the gradual 
accumulation and diffusion of everyday skills, (knowing how and knowing why, etc. (Lucas 
1988). It is because of these characteristics that the knowledge mechanisms and outcomes 
are difficult to confine or are non-excludable. By bringing together a large number of cities, 
learning opportunities can be offered and provided which create a strong enough 
justification for their own existence. They classified learning mechanisms into those dealing 
with knowledge generation 8 , knowledge diffusion 9  and knowledge accumulation 10 
(Duranton & Puga 2004, p. 2098). 
 
When it comes to primary school children, recent studies (conducted in low-income 
communities in the USA) found that children who were subjected to moving houses/homes 
frequently (to different communities or regions) scored lower in mathematics and reading, 
especially in the foundation phase. This was due to a variety of factors; with a large 
contributing factor identified as adjusting to a new domestic and schooling environment and 
                                                   
8 A key issue regarding the generation of knowledge in cities is the role that diversified urban environments 
plays in facilitating search and experimentation in innovation. 
9 The notion that proximity to individuals with greater skills or knowledge facilitates the enhanced acquisition 
of skills and the exchange and diffusion of knowledge because geography is pivotal to these individuals who 
choose to, or by circumstance are forced, to live in the hinterland are subject to less potential interaction with 
teachers or instructors. 
10The learning and training facilities (basic and higher education, vocational and technical training as well as 
the embodied knowledge learnt by individuals that they are able to use in their current or future occupations. 
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coping with anxiety, while continuing to keep up with an existing curriculum at the new 
school (Brisson & Duerr 2014) 
 
When affordable housing construction cannot be contained to well-located urban sites the 
new occupants of the new schemes become vulnerable to many economic upheavals that 
may lead them to move to cheaper locations that offer a less desirable quality of life. When 
the cost of commuting progressively spikes because of higher public transport, fuel or 
vehicle repayments or because of interest rate instability, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
balance a family’s budget as disposable income erodes sharply and the possibility of 
frequently moving house/home becomes a reality. Containing the negative impacts of spikes 
in the cost of living can be achieved through strategic and well-located affordable housing as 
rental escalations are annual and escalation rates are overwhelmingly market-related at 
Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) + 4% — this gives families the scope to plan and budget long 
in advance. And since commuting costs are reasonable (owing to short distances travelled) 
budget shocks can be better absorbed, even without upward income adjustment. 
 
The “spatial distribution” of amenities and activities of employers and employees (hereafter 
described as “agents”) in a city is the principal component of a varying number of negative 
externalities such as urban decay, the extent of service delivery, socio-economic segregation, 
traffic congestion and poor road infrastructure and networks. Regarding positive 
externalities, these include factors/attributes that most affect the value of land and real 
estate  (Hurtubia & Bierlaire 2014).  
2.2.2 Economic Mobility and the concentration of poverty 
Society and the interaction among economic agents are both harmonized when the working 
class are progressively or even gradually afforded a greater chance of accessing modern 
social amenities and given a fair chance to have balanced, safe and harmonious domestic 
environments (Rosenblatt et al. 2012). 
 
A recent and substantial body of quantitative research emerged in the USA which used 
“multivariate statistical techniques to establish the degree to which neighborhood 
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environments affect the social and economic outcomes of low-income… families and their 
children” (Galster 2007, p. 3)11. This research largely indicated that a narrower band of 
employment opportunities and an increased propensity to engage in unlawful activities was 
highly probable for those who grew up in areas of concentrated poverty. The research found 
that the type of neighborhood one grew up in appeared to be a key determinant of one’s 
“opportunity structure”. This type of research has, however, been marred by controversy, 
especially as it relates to biased methodologies and can therefore regarded as anecdotal best 
(Galster 2007).  
 
Sharkey (2009) documented a similar study conducted in Pennsylvania and Washington DC 
on the subject of economic mobility; in this study, 5,000 families were surveyed over a 
decade. The study found that the severity or rate of poverty in a neighbourhood where 
children grew up had a strong correlation with their ultimate mobility along the income 
ladder as adults. The neighbourhood dynamics were a stronger determinant of economic 
mobility than their respective home environment which indicated that they were more 
susceptible to the influence of their community than their parents were a generation before. 
Comparatively, this correlation was far stronger than even the difference in their parents’ 
level of education to theirs. In South Africa, the evidence for this claim was observed in a 
2011 social study conducted by the Gordon Institute of Business Science (University of 
Pretoria) that found that the largest determinant of the potential extent of economic mobility 
for people under the age of 35 in the GCR was how much each subject’s father earned. 
 
In moderate contrast, Jacobus (2015) suggests that integration and social mixing itself, 
among income and class groups, cannot be relied on as the cornerstone to achieving diversity 
in economic mobility. His assertion is that it is the reluctance or refusal [attitude]to integrate 
within society which should be eliminated to ensure diversified mobility. Furthermore, 
endeavours that seek to integrate across communities along dividing lines must be 
encouraged for the sake of creating sustainable regions and economies. Doing this would 
                                                   
11See reviews by Haveman and Wolfe 1995; Ellen and Turner 1997, 2003; Leventhal and Brookes-Gunn 2000; 
Sampson et al. 2002; Lupton 2003 for further explanations. 
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create adequately resourced communities who can broadly benefit from living in higher-
opportunity locations. He concludes that striving for the latter is sufficient to justify the 
promulgation of government policies and societal intervention that promote integration and 
diversity. Land in established and well-serviced neighbourhoods of the city presents an 
optimum opportunity as places where inclusive housing can occur (Overman, Punga & 
Turner 2003). 
2.2.3 Affordable Housing in Gauteng Province 
Since the democratic dispensation in 1994, Government’s housing policies have dominated 
the economic and social discourse. The focus has been narrowly confined to fully-subsidised 
low-cost housing, or RDP/BNG housing as it has come to be known. 12  Although many 
discussions in public fora have centered around the pace and quality of subsidised housing 
projects there has been a concerted mind-shift over the last five years to reformulate better 
policy to deliver housing on a larger scale, across multiple levels of affordability and a more 
intense use of land parcels (densification)(Melzer 2015; Tissington 2011).  In 2006, the 
affordable housing market began to expand, with efforts by the government to lend into the 
market and to encourage commercial banks to follow suit. However, adverse credit 
conditions and the introduction of the National Credit Act in the latter half of 2007, coupled 
with the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, slowed home loan activity; resulting in rental 
housing gradually becoming an appealing option to households. 
 
In 2011 a State of Cities Report13 (South African Cities Network, 2011) highlighted the slow 
and unsatisfactory progress in delivering housing to the affordable housing market segment. 
Despite government’s earlier attempts to entice home mortgage lenders by subsidizing the 
purchase price paid by new buyers from households earning between R3,500 and R15,00014 , 
very few households were able to access private home mortgage funding in the gap housing 
market even after the introduction of these subsidies in 2008. Issues identified were, inter 
                                                   
12 See, White Paper on Housing 1994; The Housing Act 107 of 1997 (amended by Acts 28 of 1999, 60 of 1999, 
4 of 2001, 43 of 2007); Breaking New Ground 2004; and the Framework for Inclusionary Housing Policy in 
South Africa 2007. 
13 published by the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance (“CAHF”) and South African Cities Network 
14 through the Finance Linked Individual Subsidy Program (FLISP) 
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alia, the insufficient supply of suitable and well-located land, delays and costs in providing 
bulk civil infrastructure and services and a mismatch between available stock and end-user 
appetite. The latter explained by consumers showing limited interest in buying homes on the 
outskirts of their respective cities. 
 
More has been done to encourage rental as an attractive form of tenure as property 
developers found more suitable development land that would enhance their 
investment/property portfolios. Simply put, the better the site the more valuable the 
income-generating property that is built and operated on that site.  These maneuverings 
have boded well for the affordable (or gap) housing sector as private equity funds have 
become big investors and funders in the market, with banks increasingly becoming 
amenable to fund developers with proven track-records. Policy interventions are taking 
place in both national and various provincial housing departments to make available finance 
for the development of high density schemes for rental. Gauteng has the largest number of 
institutional and state-sponsored funders for affordable housing. These include: TUHF, 
NURCHA, GPF, NHFC), HIFSA, Chartwell Housing Finance and the commercial banks with 
their specialised lending divisions. 
 
2.3 The Evolution of Impact Investing  
Social Impact Investing often used interchangeably with the term responsible investing can 
be pursued in a wide range of sectors for enhancing people’s welfare, catering for basic needs 
and increasing amenities in a community or region. This is typically achieved through 
physical and economic infrastructure investment, human capacity building and training and 
the creation and targeting of employment opportunities for marginalised workers, whether 
directly (i.e., as employees) or indirectly (i.e., through procurement).  These investors seek 
market-based solutions to the world's most pressing challenges, including sustainable 
agriculture, affordable housing, affordable and accessible healthcare, clean technology and 
telecommunications, and inclusive financial services sectors. The aforementioned are 
identified as among those with the greatest potential for social impact. Enterprises 
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intimately involved in these fields form part of the optimal investment pool that impact 
investors target (GIIN, 2014)15   
 
Historically, the majority of impact investing occurs in private markets, typically through 
private equity investment and financing using instruments such as debt, equity and 
guarantees. The intention has always been to generate financial return, while being a force 
for social and environmental upliftment, this being the triple bottom line (Matthews et al. 
2015). Triple bottom line gains are the outcome of a free-market philosophy namely impact 
investing. Globally, the market is buoyant, with major proponents being high net-worth 
individuals going beyond philanthropy, and investment funds; whether they be sovereign 
wealth, pension, exchange traded, collective investment schemes whose investment 
mandate(s) resonate with the UN’s PRI16, or whether or not they are signatories of the PRI. 
The sustainability and success of impact investments rests on the assurance that they are 
largely undertaken to generate a financial return. The pairing of these two motivations — 
profit-making and being a force for good — by financiers aims to encourage investee 
enterprises to develop in financially sustainable ways. 
 
JPMorgan-Chase Bank provided a conservative estimate of the potential profit opportunity 
arising from the provision of affordable urban housing in emerging markets to be about 
US$177billion (O’Donohue & Bugg-Levine 2010). Other sectors, including the venerable 
Microfinance sector, are all exponentially smaller in estimated potential combined 
investment and potential profits. The social and/or environmental impact is likely to be 
delivered through the business operations and processes employed, the products or services 
produced  and/or the target population served (Arosio 2011).  Clearly, the risk of an impact 
investment will be particular to the investment, including its stage, sector and geography. 
                                                   
 
 
16  Principles for Responsible Investments— An investment accord of the United Nations Environmental 
Programme- Financial Initiatives (“UNEP-FI”), whereby signatories publicly pledge their commitment to, and 
undertake to abide by, the six(6) voluntary and aspirational principles of ESG promoting investment 





Over the past decade, social stock exchanges have been created in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries 17 . These exchanges target smaller high-growth enterprises in sectors such as 
health, sanitation, education, environmental protection, housing for the poor and working 
class, sustainable forestry and organic agriculture and other “base of the pyramid” 18 
interventions. Social stock exchanges seek to build a platform for social businesses to attract 
capital, and these markets provide liquidity and facilitate transactions for companies that 
generate both economic and social returns (Wilson et al. 2015, p. 30). 
 
Advances have been made in the development of frameworks for the measurement of 
investment impact. The Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (“IRIS”) framework 
provides a taxonomy to standardize social impact reporting and facilitate the creation of 
                                                   
17 None such “non-OECD” country was located on the African continent 
18 “The phrase "Base of the Pyramid" is used for two interrelated concepts: 
1) A socio-economic designation for the 4-5 billion individuals that live primarily in developing countries 
and whose annual per capita incomes fall below $1,500 (in PPP terms); and 
2) an emerging field of business strategy that focuses on products, services, and enterprises to serve people 
throughout the base of the world's income pyramid.” http://www.brinq.com/resources/bop  
 
Source:  O'Donohue & Bugg-Levine 2010 
Figure 1: Motivations of Impact Investors 
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industry benchmarks. These new benchmarks have consideraby reduced due dilligence 
costs because they are standardized and parsimonious, making it easy to collate and 
compare/ventures options . As their use spreads they should become a generally acceptable 
acid-test for the nature investments made and the level of ESG related impact they have 
created. This has been a crucial step in ensuring the sector continues to distinguish itself 
from regular venture capital and private equity investments. A particularly notable feat is 
the development of a set of reporting standards called the Impact Reporting & Investment 
Standards (“IRIS”) by GIIN. Without further development of standards and benchmarks for 
ESG performance, investors will: 
a) Revert to relying on their own judgment and proprietary systems to rate the risk or 
return hurdles; and 
b) Be limited in their ability to understand how the social performance of their investments 
compares to those made by other investors (peers). 
2.3.1 Fiduciary Responsibility and Impact Investing 
Less than a decade ago, socially responsible investment (“SRI”) was at loggerheads with the 
fiduciary duty of trustees, of which all recognised private equity firms, investment and fund 
managers are bound by (because they are mandatories investing on others’ behalf).  A 
comprehensive report published by the UNEP’s Finance Initiative in October 2005 and 
commonly known as the Freshfields Report (UNEP Finance Initiative 2005)  highlighted the 
disparity that existed in what it identified as value-driven and the distinctly different values-
driven investment philosophies; with both centered around the decision-making process of 
fiduciaries. The report suggests that the former is about following the correct process (the 
fiduciary duty of “prudential management”), while the latter is more about pursuing a proper 
objective (the fiduciary duty of acting only in the interest of their beneficiaries). 
 
The bone of contention around SRI and the fiduciary duty centered around the duty to act in 
the interest of the beneficiaries, where many contended that pursuing SRI went against the 
profit maximization objectives of investors who were seemingly being made vulnerable to 
an untested asset class, which could dilute their investment returns The report largely 
concludes that SRI could be pursued in investment decision-making where express or tacit 
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consent was given by the beneficiaries. Furthermore, it suggests that ESG considerations can 
validly be included in investment and disinvestment decisions so as to more precisely 
analyze the future financial performance of the subject asset  (Richardson, 2011).  Formal, 
written and deliberate disclosure by fiduciaries to beneficiaries — about ESG considerations 
used for investment decision-making — is not mandatory in South Africa, it is however 
fervently encouraged so as to bolster the often nebulous issue of tacit consent. 
2.3.2 Impact finance and investing: Screening investments and return expectations 
O’Donohue and Bugg-Levine (2010) contend that insofar as investor expectations go in the 
world of impact investing there seems to be a mixed bag of investor expectations. On the face 
of it, there are many who legitimately expect their impact investments to outperform 
traditional assets/positions in the same sector/category, while other investors are content 
with trading-off enhanced financial return for achieving greater societal impact from their 
funds. A trend is emerging among newer entrants into the SRI segment who focus their 
funding activities on endeavours that are aimed at society’s most vulnerable people; these 
being minimum-wage earners and the indigent, typically referred to as the “base of the 
pyramid”. The credit risk associated with funding opportunities that cater for this 
designation is so volatile that it typically prices most deals out of the market. As a result, 
investors that are active in transactions for base of the pyramid candidates are amenable to 
trading-off appropriate returns in order to make a powerful and enduring social impact and 
to enable the sustainability pf the endeavour/product. This trade-off has generally been 
deemed as concessionary funding19. The extent to which this trade-off can be negotiated 
would ordinarily be determined at a point lying between the maximum anticipated impact 
and the best rate of return that would be expected in the market for a similar transaction.  
Return expectations and whether or not impact investments should surpass traditional 
investments is reliant on investor perception, the type of investment instrument, the 
investment term, and the “appropriateness” of the benchmark used. The determinants of 
whether investors’ return could surpass or equal other market investments could lie in 
                                                   




whether investments are in developed or emerging markets. Donohue and Bugg-Levine 
(2010) confirm the existence of evidence which suggests impact investments in advanced 
economies tend to attract investors that sacrifice financial return as a trade-off for societal 
impact. In contrast, those in developing nations are more than likely to expect competitive 
risk-weighted returns. They further contend that this may be due to the regulatory 
enticements that exist in developed economies to encourage investments in lower-yielding 
social endeavours. These enticements would, inter alia, take the form of tax reliefs and 
incentives which often don’t exist in developing nations for a myriad of reasons. This 
observation about SRI return expectations also applies to most funding instruments from 
equity to secured debt. The subjects of their research (interview respondents) did, however, 
indicate a possible concessionary stance could be granted for developing nations’ debt where 
the cost of debt in the investee country is higher than the reasonable anticipated impact 
investment return. 
 
The data provided below, supporting these return expectations, are depicted in the figure 
below. The data for South African impact investors, or investors domiciled and investing in 
emerging markets was not found. The expectation of return from the point of view of 




2.3.3 Investment Management and Disbursement of Impact Investment Capital 
The potential for impact investments to attract a larger portion of mainstream private capital 
and anticipate that more investors will seek to generate positive social and/or 
environmental impact when making investment decisions has been recognized. Affordable 
housing has been long recognised among other sectors as where the greatest potential for 
social impact exists. As such, enterprises in that field form part of the optimal investment 
pool for impact investors to target. As with investing in most asset classes, manager selection 
is a primary determinant of investment success. In turn, selection by investment managers 
is informed by how well the manager is with the asset class and key market indicators and 
tendencies. This has, in many emerging markets, created challenges as managers cite a lack 
of performance data and overall industry track record to support their attempts to build 
capital raising strategies (Arosio 2011).  
Source: O'Donohue & Bugg-Levine (2010) 




In global capital markets, funds are allocated and reallocated  in order to optimize their risk-
weighted returns. This optimization strategy is nebulous when dealing with impact 
investment as social and envirnmnetal returns are incorporated into the total financial 
return that the investor makes. For this reason, the impact investmnet asset class has 
historically been the preserve of quasi-philanthropic high net-worth individuals and 
organisations with expanded or highly developed corporate social responsibility 
programmes where financial refurns were an ancillary objective of capital deployment. 
 
2.4 The Urban Agglomeration and Historic Labour Dynamics in the GCR 
Engineering a livable environment – and by this it is meant livable by a diverse cross-section 
of GCR inhabitants and not just development for a narrow ensemble of speculative investors 
and the bourgeoisie– has not been possible in South African as a result of our very recent 
discriminatory past. The Johannesburg urban agglomeration, which includes some part of the 
already defined GCR (namely Ekurhuleni Evaton, Tshwane, Soshanguve, Vereeneging and 
the West Rand), is the 36th largest urban agglomeration in the world with 13.2 million 
inhabitants, according to a July 2015 Danish publication, “City Population”. Compared with 
its national counterparts, it seems to be on its own league. For instance, Cape Town’s urban 
agglomeration is ranked 108th with a mere population of 4.2 million people (Brinkhoff, 2015). 
Achieving city-wide growth of inclusive and well located mass housing can rapidly change 
the city-region to one which makes “the kinds of physical and social infrastructure that 
strengthen the economic base of the metropolitan region as an exporter of goods and 
services” (Harvey 1989, p. 8).  
2.4.1 Historic Spatial Formation of Gauteng and its Metros. 
The current spatial distribution is rooted in the deliberate actions of the 1940’s Nationalist 
Party’s Public Works machinery, which Mubiwa & Annegarn (2013) describe as follows:  
 
Between 1948 to the late 1950s the growth in industrialisation and 
urbanisation brought about the regional consolidation that led to the 
establishment of such industrial towns as Kempton Park and Alberton; this 
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came long after the established Johannesburg urban settlements for the mining 
belt on the Witwatersrand reef. The development of new steel and 
petrochemical industries, Iscor and Sasol, respectively, which were initiated as 
State interventions to industrialise South Africa, led to the creation of industry 
in the newly formed Vanderbijlpark, Sasolburg and Vereeniging. It was, 
however, discriminatory apartheid legislation (e.g., the Bantu Urban Areas 
Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 and the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950) that 
extensively transformed the land-use structure into the apartheid city. Citizens 
were grouped into racially demarcated precincts, separated by buffer strips of 
at least 100 m wide, or by distinct industrial or environmental buffer zones 
(citing Frescura, 1983; 1992; 2000; and 2001).  
 
The development of new high-density townships for designated “Black dwellers” was 
prominent; these settlements were established on urban peripheries to relocate non-whites 
who had been forcibly moved from inner city suburbs to the utmost reaches of the cities of 
Gauteng (formerly Transvaal). Ultimately, the spatial configuration of the region widened 
and travel distances increased. To ensure that the relocated populations could still serve 
whites and provide their menial labour, the State constructed railway lines to the townships 
and heavily subsidised a commuter bus-service linking outlying townships to main urban 
centers. To ensure that populations could be contained, road networks in these townships 
were designed to contained the flow of people via a handful of entry and exit roads. The lack 
of security of tenure for properties “resulted in an almost total absence of normal home 
improvement and citizen-driven urban infrastructure improvement as the houses were 
State-owned and rented”(Mubiwa & Annegarn 2013, p.11). 
 
The predominantly east-west transport routes, largely railway, were established to serve all 
the mines of the then Witwatersrand Gold Mining Corridor20. What emerged was a linear 
spatial formation with development and settlement activity radiating out from that line/axis 
                                                   




of the Witwatersrand Reef (Fair et al., 1956 cited by (Mubiwa & Annegarn 2013)). Through 
the 1900’s, the North of Johannesburg CBD became increasingly affluent. The airport, with 
its extensive cargo infrastructure, created the primary and ancillary industrial nodes of the 
east of the Witwatersrand.  
 
The Black, Indian and Coloured workers of the now Gauteng Province were confined to 
townships located 25km or more from their nearest urban employment centers, the only 
exceptions being Riverlea and Westbury (formerly called Western Native Township). 
Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni metros continued to grow explicitly along these 
racial lines until the mid-90s. Much of what we see today in terms of racial and class spatial 
distributions are due to economic opportunity redistribution of the recent past and the 
present-day. Exponentially superior upward-mobility enjoyed by the Black, Coloured and 
Indian population – all this over only the last two decades. The scale of progress in this regard, 
however, has been far from adequate. 
2.4.2 Government’s Response to the Current Spatial Distribution 
Throughout Gauteng, and arguably the rest of the country, we have often seen that 
government’s response to the housing shortfall is the politically charged and divisive 
“catalytic mega-project”; where local and provincial governments inject capital to further 
reinforce the inefficiency of existing social infrastructure.  The construction of such places is 
ordinarily touted as the best means of procuring benefits for historically disadvantaged 
people within a particular jurisdiction.  Benefits, such as job creation and the upliftment of 
local economies through involvement in the supply chain, are proclaimed. For the most part, 
the benefits of these mega projects are typically indirect and materialise on a far smaller 
magnitude and scope than the jurisdiction within which they lie. The finished product is also 
largely regarded as tawdry by its beneficiaries.  Harvey (1989) argues that these mega 
greenfield or urban regeneration projects “also have the habit of becoming such a focus of 
public and political attention that they divert concern and even resources from the broader 




The less evident long-term effect of these mega-projects is that because they (a) cater to 
slightly lower-than-middle income families and (b) are built in the hinterland near 
established and largely underdeveloped townships, they can easily become places of 
concentrated poverty within one generation. This also carries through to the plethora of 
housing schemes already built in areas just outside the city, where existing economic and 
social infrastructure is sorely underdeveloped. 
 
Le Roux (2012), in her research, investigated the consequences of the Johannesburg 
municipality’s proposed land use policies. She compared the spatial impact of two different 
simulations (scenarios) to determine whether spatial equality will be restored to the city by 
the year 2030. The study considered two options, namely a SLEUTH21  and Dyna-CLUE22 
model, both of which are advanced computer-aided spatial models (i.e., cellular automata 
models), which are widely used to model urban growth. The conditions simulated by the 
most suitable model (the Dyna-Clue model) were found to be: 
a. The first scenario, referred to as the ‘as-is’ scenario, assumes continued growth from the 
past decade. The sprawled city with its inherently inefficient social infrastructure is 
clearly evident in the AS-IS scenario with a large amount of informal settlements in the 
south and north-east of the city. 
b. The policy-led scenario focuses on the immediate and strict implementation of land use 
policies and strategies designed to limit growth, densify transport corridors and 
encourage investment in low cost housing in accessible locations. This scenario depicted 
a far more compact city with a concentration of high-rise business and residential 
accommodation for a wide variety of income/wealth groups and government housing in 
the central areas and along transport corridors (Wray et al. 2013, p. 44). 
 
                                                   
21  “SLEUTH”- Slope, Land cover, Exclusion, Urbanisation, Transportation and Hillshade- a largely convexly 
curved multilayered model that does not, however, have dynamic temporal factors.  
22“Dyna-CLUE”- Dynamic Conversion Land Use & its Effectiveness- a computer program with spatial factors 
such as- “land use maps, locational driving factors and spatial policies and restrictions. The non-spatial data 
inputs are as follows: policy scenarios, regional driving factors and expert knowledge” 
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Le Roux (2012) established that by implementing Johannesburg’s proposed land use policies 
(the policy-led scenario) of implementing densification corridors and restricting 
development outside the urban development boundary, more economic opportunities 
would be provided to the poorer households in the southern parts of the city (Le Roux 2012, 
p. 5). However, even with far-reaching policy intervention, segregation within both the 
northern and southern regions of Johannesburg will remain.  
 
A key finding was that in the ‘as-is’ scenario of growth – along the same lines as has been the 
case over the past 15 years – would result in increased informality of human settlements, 
low densities and a large sprawled landscape by 2030. The ‘as-is’ scenario also skews 
economic opportunities and the benefits of growth in favour of the wealthy northern 
suburbs of Johannesburg whilst restricting the majority of low-income households to the 
southern parts of the city. The converse is applicable to the policy-led outcome where the 
benefit of increased economic activity as being enjoyed by a broad area spanning 
Johannesburg where low and middle income earners become spread throughout the city and 
are not just concentrated in the south of Johannesburg; running from Booysens through to 
Soweto (Le Roux 2012). 
 
As the GCR grows, urbanises and further spatially integrates, it will need definitive and 
unflinching spatial guidelines and restrictions informed by a medium to long-term spatial 
and socio-economic strategy. This will bring the development of the region/city in line with 
Le Roux’s “policy-led” 2030 modeled outcome for the city. Success is possible (a) if the 
government remains steadfast in implementing the spatial strategy and (b) if the province 
grows faster than it currently is because that is when resource allocation and capital 
deployment will be under exceptional scrutiny. 
2.4.3 Labour Market Behaviour to Urbanisation  
Duranton & Puga (2004) suggest that far-reaching strides can be made in high-density 
locales to improve the functioning of labour markets insofar as how well the matching 
function operates. An increase in the number of agents (whether job seekers or employers) 
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in a city “reduces search frictions and results in smaller proportions of unemployed workers 
and unfilled vacancies” (p. 2093). 
 
The ownership of large number of businesses in certain sectors may allow such owners 
monopsony power leverage. The wielding of such monopsony power in that sector gives 
employers the ability to operate in a strategically underhanded manner rather than being 
conventionally competitive. This could complicate and slightly weaken the tendency of firms 
to agglomerate either into existing high-value economic nodes or for the purpose of creating 
new high-activity nodes. Coppola and Nuzzolo (2011) contend that increasing industry 
agglomeration diminishes monopsony power as it brings about an increase in competition 
for labour and also increases strategic interactions within the local labour markets, bringing 
about and reinforcing employee benefits and power as workers can move across and 
between sectors provided they can deal with the costs involved.  
 
South Africa’s chronic unemployment rate makes difficult to have a well-functioning and 
competitive labour market, especially in the labour pool at the bottom half of the 
income/organizational pyramid; from the base (clerical/operational) to the middle (junior 
management). The monopsony power wielded by, for example, blue chip corporates is such 
that competition in this labour pool is disproportionately fierce, this owing to the number of 
job seekers in these brackets. The nature of this competition somewhat distorts the labour 
market by ostensibly exhibiting how expendable theses workers are, even though median 
wages in this bracket are very low. (p. 2085-6). Those able to find decent jobs at the level 
below and including junior management eke out a living and finance their lifestyles with 
credit. This makes them vulnerable to economic setbacks such as the erosion of their 
disposable income because of commuting and volatile credit costs.  These are issues that 
warrant the need for solutions and measures of redress – redress in the form of interventions 
to ameliorate commuting/transportation or, better yet and more impactful housing.  
 
Existing theoretical literature on economic growth suggest that it is a symptom of growth in 
the number of employers or employment opportunities.  At the meso level, this growth of 
employers or employment activities has classically been attributed to an interplay between 
32 
 
(a) a city/region’s ability to produce an assortment of goods and services and (b) the 
accumulation of factors of production as key contributors(Coppola & Nuzzolo 2011). 
 
Urban sprawl, according to Harvey (1989), does not allow the optimization of consumer’s 
buying power. Instead it stifles the achievement of economies of scale and prevents a 
diversification of product/service offerings and hampers the growth of labour markets. It is 
not just bad for producers and merchants, but is also bad for those particularly remote 
communities because they become even more vulnerable to income-eroding factors. Under 
such conditions, economic growth endures prolonged weakness as demand and supply do 
not adequately interact to create industries, economic and employment opportunities.  
 
In densified urban formations such as cities or regions, entrepreneurs and established 
businesses are able to harness consumer buying power because it finds the most value in 
densely populated areas, even in prolonged economic slumps. Downturns, which typically 
create conditions such as chronically high unemployment rates and a high cost of credit that 
erodes consumer’s buying power, are navigable for businesses in areas where there is a 
plethora of amenities and a sheer amount of demand, which creates economies of scale. The 
presence of sophisticated public services and infrastructure in densely populated areas with 
sufficient scale of demand makes goods and services easy to supply, warehouse, distribute, 
insure against risk and, ultimately sell (Harvey, 1978). 
 
One such instance that serves to reinforce the relationship between densifying and 
optimizing labour markets is Helsley and Strange’s (2002) “matching” argument between 
entrepreneurs and specialised inputs available in a city to justify why cities and the benefits 
derived from living in them favour innovation. A limitation around the perennial nature of 
innovation-lead growth means that new innovations must remain at almost proportional to 
the quantity of past innovations in a particular city in order for that growth to remain 
sustainable. A good case-in-point is Silicon Valley and Hollywood, both in California, USA. 
This ensures that competition among innovators and entrepreneurs in other locales doesn’t 




Venables (2002) argues that cities improve the quality of matches and drastically improve 
productivity as a result of the higher quality matching. He suggests that a random worker 
(whose skills can be high or low) when matched with a highly skilled local partner to 
produce/conduct a good/service will certainly be more productive as a result of that match. 
However, the productive gains from having a high-skilled partner are greater for high-skilled 
workers. The enhanced matching function that is derived from operating in a city is a further 
reason to justify the premium paid for business premises; coupled with the relative ease of 
poaching employees. It is the reason many businesses are happy to pay the premium. It does 
not, however, bode well for urban land suitable for residential development as it drives up 
prices. The price in many instances may make developing affordable housing incredibly 
difficult without concessions that rescue the cost to build, operate and maintain, such as 
affordable housing schemes. This cost becomes relatively less the higher the density of the 
scheme because of the economies of scale available to property developers. 
 
2.5 Urban Land Economics and the Scope for Modeling 
 A number of recent events have led to the reinforcement of Alonso’s bid-rent theory and 
particularly the attaching of a price premium for businesses to operate in the local business 
district. These include (a) drive to pursue innovation-led growth (described in previous sub-
chapter), (b) the ease with which employee poaching can be conducted, (c) the presence of 
adequate physical and technological infrastructure, (d) the assembly of a wide variety of 
amenities and support services, and (e) the proximity to expert consulting services over the 
last century. It is the extent to which advantage is taken of personnel poaching and enjoying 
the benefits of population density in the business district that etches up the premium to be 
paid for operating there. This premium does not, however, capture all, or even most, of the 
gains to be made in the area. Firms constantly face a trade-off between  
a. central locations (these increase operating costs), which allows them to capture a larger 
share of the market (enabling them to generate additional revenue), and  
b. locations in the hinterland (these reduce operating costs), this enables them to better 
compete with the intensity of competition (allowing them to more keenly price their 




Lauridsen (2012) further asserts that spatial economic modeling resembles typical time-
series modeling and forecasting in that it incorporates “the explanatory variables of the 
neighboring spatial units (as well as their error term) into account.” He does, however, 
suggest that the similarities end there as “spatial dependence” for discrete space is able to 
go forward and backward – whereas time dependence is only able to go forward. The remedy 
suggested is opting to deem space as continuous rather than discrete. This would further 
align it to time series as it would remove the possibility of going backward.  
 
The glaring drawback, however, is that it then defines space/land as a near-infinite resource 
and that no competition exists for alternate uses or that once space (land) is used/developed 
that unique unit/tract of land does not diminish the available stock, whereas in reality it does. 
The history of spatial economic modeling is summarised below: 
The bulk of existing modeling initiatives are primarily GIS based and/or linked to spread 
sheets containing demographic or housing projections. As such, the South African urban 
modeling typologies are categorised differently from international typologies and include a 
broader range of urban modeling techniques. Land use modeling in South Africa has the 
Source: Batty (2009) 
Figure 3: Temporal Flow-diagram of Spatial Economic Modeling  
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potential to be the foremost tool in forecasting the evolution of our cities, from both a 
productivity and resource allocation perspective. It proves highly effective in also predicting 
the outcomes of specific interventions such as integrated public transport systems and 
property development.  
 
General equilibrium models of spatial economics entail making detailed assumptions about 
the spatial structure, the production structure, and the mobility of people, goods and ideas - 
all this under increasing returns. These details are not able to be credibly be fused together 
without analytical solutions. Such solutions can emanate from uncomplicated but tractable 
models of cities and regions. Firstly, what is important in such models is that they must 
incorporate all the relevant costs associated with trade and productivity within the city or 
region. This plays a fundamental role in any modern models, but their microeconomic 
foundations have received insufficient attention in the past - it would likely involve looking 
beyond merely transport costs and “open the black box of the multiplicity of transactions 
costs associated with trade between different parties” (p. 9). Secondly, the researcher or 
provider of the analytical solution must develop or adapt a reasonable theory of proximity 
(for lack of a better name). Such a theory would provide some detail or answers, based on 
solid micro foundations, as to why direct interactions between economic agents matter  and 
to what extent- it would be expected that non-market interactions such as knowledge spill-
overs and localised specialization would be considered in the developing of the theory of 
proximity (Lauridsen, 2012). 
 
There are, however, opponents of the “spill-over” argument, but the rationale reinforcing 
their positions is archaic; in terms of the modern age of information technology. Many who 
establish arguments, which depart from Krugman’s position on spillovers “leave no paper 
trail by which they may be measured and tracked” (Krugman 1991, p. 53). They fail to take 
into consideration the extent to which formal and informal dissemination of information and 
practices can happen either via the internet using computers and smartphones – evidence of 
related cases would largely be anecdotal. More contemporary empirical research has been 
able to establish base evidence that spill-overs leave some paper trails, many of which are 
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closely associated to patent-related activity – the evidence suggests that patent citations and 
creation decrease in relation to proximity to a city (Combes & Duranton 2006, p. 2) 
2.5.1 Commuting Dynamics in the Subject Locations 
 
 
Above is a graphic depicting daily travel into and within the three metro municipalities of 
Gauteng. From left to right the first map depicts commuting in Johannesburg, the second is 
Tshwane and the last is Ekurhuleni. The graphics above represent the state of affairs before 
the national highway e-Tolling, Tshwane Metro’s Areyeng Bus Rapid Transit system and the 
full roll-out of the Gautrain and City of Johannesburg’s Reya Vaya Phase 1 BRT networks. 
Subsequent research for mapping the travel patterns of commuters is expected to 
forthcoming 2015 Quality of Life survey which will be published by March 2016 (after the 
research is submitted). It is expected that some changes would have occurred on the basis 
that commuting costs had drastically decreased for millions of workers who use the Rea Vaya 
and have materially changed, over the medium to long term.  
Workers have been able to move towards areas that minimize their commuting costs, 
especially with the roll-out of Gautrain’s complementary bus service, which makes 
commuting effortless for those within walking distance of these busses. Much of what we 
observe with commuters coming from outside their respective metros is as a result of 
lifestyle choices/constraints or affordability constraints of their current accommodation.  
 
 Source- GCRO (2011) 
Figure 4: Daily commuting to the three Gauteng Metros 
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An account of how people commute in Gauteng is provided below. Below is a pie chart of 
travel purposes. It delves into work and job-search related travel and how better location of 
dense rental housing within better proximity to employment nodes could drastically reduce 
travel cost and therefore be an aid to preserve savings. Taxis are a main feature with an 
estimated 75% of job seekers using them as their main mode travel and their fares are 
abhorrently volatile. 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of Travel Purposes  
Source- 2011 QoL Survey by GCRO 
Mode of Transportation % of respondents
Car and Public transport 3,40%
walk only 10,20%
Private car/motorcycle 
(driver of passenger) 29,70%




Taxi and bus 0,6%
Taxi and train 10,6%
Bus and train 0,1%
 Source- 2011 QoL Survey 
Table 1: Commuter’s Mode of Transport 
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2.5.2 Land Use: Modeling and Spatial Econometrics 
In developed countries and many cosmopolitan cities in developing counties, working-class 
or so-called blue-collar neighbourhoods or boroughs are socially fragmented from middle or 
upper-middle income areas. This fragmentation typically occurs along ethnic or racial lines. 
Ducruet & Beauguitte (2013) suggest that we attempt to arrive at a more impartial viewpoint, 
their contention being that a more analytically fruitful lens through which to observe 
fragmentation would be in terms of people’s relations with the state and different forms of 
capital. This is a fitting and poignant point-of-departure for a study conducted in South Africa. 
By doing this we can view housing in South Africa “as a key resource that connects state 
policies both with the forms of reproduction and (dis)organization of the disadvantaged”.  
 
As government policies and technology further develop and become more sophisticated, so 
we begin to see the development and sophistication of the real estate market and financial 
capital markets. This sophistication should, in theory, directly and indirectly lead to greater 
access to housing (across all market segments – from low-cost subsidised government 
housing to opulent private houses and apartments). This occurs through the opening up of 
formal credit markets [and more specifically home loans] and this, in turn, contributes 
directly to the undoing of the historical culture of disposition and insecurity of tenure for 
people’s dwellings and the promotion of home ownership and residential construction. This, 
indeed, has happened throughout urban settings in South Africa and was most pronounced 
during the housing boom of 1999 to 2008 where the market’s buoyancy changed the 
neighbourhood demographics of almost all middle and upper-middle income boroughs.  
 
Surveying the demographic profiles of a typical peripheral neighborhood 20 years ago and 
the same neighbourhood today, it is evident that the changes have been minimal. This is a 
further reinforcement of the generational constraints that exist in economic mobility. 
Further interrogation of private-sector-led community development in the peripheral 
neighbourhoods of Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni reveals that opportunism has 
been embedded through the financialization of the livelihood strategies of poor households. 
We see established grocery chains that serve the low-to-middle income market following the 
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small cabal of property developers into Black and Coloured townships to establish 
operations along with the entry-level banking segment as well as base-of-the-pyramid 
orientated clothing chain stores. While we generally regard these as well-meaning 
endeavours that cater to underserved and under-resourced communities, they are also 
definitely positioned to capture any surpluses these communities may accumulate over the 
years of earning meager incomes, their pervasive presence serves as a perpetual enticement 
to spend rather than save. They also indirectly promote urban decay by capturing the market 
that has come to be the mainstay of shopping malls and stores, this capture leads to a 
diminishing level of economic activity in the already somewhat declining CBDs. 
 
Finally, because this hinterland community development process has led to a 
commodification of those who live on the periphery- a factor on which it highly depended 
upon, it has somewhat exposed the real and looming problems for class reproduction and 
deeper fracture lines among the urban poor. 
2.5.3 Modeling Architecture Available to the Urban Researcher 
Following Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Imai (1982), whose literature typically assumes that 
productivity (or output) is assumed to be the product of a standard production function 
multiplied by an externality term equal to the sum of output in other locations weighted by 
a decay function.  The function itself is beyond the scope of the research but it asserts 
increasing returns to scale the denser the population around CBD(s) and the denser the 
concentration of employers and entrepreneurs. Such modeling relies on a so-called spatial 
decay function and the extent to which it can be related to proximity to an economic hub or 
to commuting costs to either encourage densification or encourage people, most notably the 
working class, to continue to live in the urban periphery. If the level of spatial decay, as well 
as the level of commuting costs, are high in the urban periphery, then the rationale for 
staying in such an area is reduced and a household is encouraged to move closer to the city, 
thereby marginally aiding its densification. The prevalence of this function in each city 
becomes the lynchpin for whether there can be a monocentric, polycentric or completely 
dispersed city. This is because the dependent variable within the spatial decay function 
amplifies in extent, the further the distance from the CBD. The decay function is low when 
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we observe decentralized and specialised business nodes that offer good access and 
economically viable business premises in terms of rentals and ownership. If there is no, or a 
negligible, decay function in a city then it becomes completely disbursed with no defined 
cores or business nodes and all areas are free to pursue and entice businesses to operate 
there, infrastructure and zoning permitting (Duranton & Puga 2004) 
 
Cities experience a transition from a monocentric to a polycentric structure and then to 
complete dispersion as the spatial decay function weakens because the decay function 
weighs down the ultimate production function. So why allow or reinforce the decay function 
in the peripheries of cities such as Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni? To encourage 
low to middle income earners in the periphery to seek work and earn incomes that allow 
them to reside within a reasonable distance from the city or their respective place of 
employment because, over time, the existing and highly inefficient infrastructure, coupled 
with a lack of strategic municipal and provincial government interventions will 
progressively amplify that decay function? 
 
Coppola and Nuzzolo (2011) posit that there are two classes of modeling frameworks for 
residential property, their use is determined according to the way in which the interactions 
between accessibility/travel costs and dwellings price are simulated (see Figure 7 below): 
a) Endogenous models, favouring the spatial decay function. The endogenous dwelling 
price models estimates the dwelling price jointly with the location of the socio-economic 
activities; or alternatively 
b) Exogenous models dwellings price where models are based on a linear multivariate 
regression. Here the demand for dwellings and subsequent selling price depends on the 
location utility of the particular given zone, the accessibility to services, the presence of 
green spaces, the state of transport infrastructure and commuting costs, which include 
both the direct monetary travel cost and the opportunity cost of the time lost to take the 
daily return trip. These are combined into the aforementioned linear regression to show 




The figure below depicts the process of each class of model: 
Zhou and Kockelman (2008) examine microscopic equilibrium of the single-family 
residential land development based on Alonso’s bid-rent theory.  They suggest that a model’s 
variables be associated with price competition. There is seemingly no support for class f 
model along the lines of exogenous and endogenous models, they suggest that equilibrium 
in incorporates exogenous factors would be based on a logistic (“logit”) regression model 
[not a hedonic regression]. These variables would be used to simulate household location 
choices in different scenarios, with low, medium and high value-of-travel-time assumptions 
coupled with a variable to denote urbanism23, that is how their model is designed. they 
support the use or a hedonic model but only in cases where there is sufficient data to 
incorporate idiosyncratic factors about each dwelling- their position I that the hedonic 
model be bolted on to their existing exogenous factor-based model and not that it be allowed 
to be a class of model all by itself [as suggested by Duranton and Puga (2004)] 
 
The ‘dwelling price’ under these modeled circumstances indicates a willingness to pay by a 
buyer, had the transaction been for rental purposes it could still be regarded that the price 
would be the rental price and not the selling price. When competition in the rental market 
for a standalone dwelling unit or a one unit in a townhouse complex or apartment block is 
                                                   
23 Urbanism- The material aspects and characteristics urban living and the cultural aspects of city life for city 
dwellers. 
Figure 6: Classes of Dwelling Price Models 
Source- Coppola & Nuzzolo (2011) 
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high enough it plays itself out with potential tenants either increasing the price they are 
willing to pay for the accommodation or committing to rent it out for longer, thus giving the 
landlord security of income for a longer period, therefore reducing the potential for vacancy 
in the rental market, much as it would decrease in the time taken to sell a property in the 
sales market. 
 
Notwithstanding the solitary UrbanSim project, it has argued that advanced modeling of 
urban spatial change within South Africa at an institutional level has not reached a high level 
of sophistication because it is limited to sporadic academic urban simulation research. 
However, Batty (2009) notes a broadening of model styles, types and computer methods on 
the fringe of the “urban modeling domain, for example GIS, that in some circumstances may 
be considered as models when compared to the key urban model types reviewed in the 
previous paragraphs” (p. 23).  Domestically, modeling projects are mainly GIS-based, 
tracking observed trends rather than simulating future scenarios, with future modeling 
based on population projections. There is a risk, however, that outdated data, different 
population projections, duplicated tools and a lack of resources could compromise urban 
spatial change modeling efforts within government (Batty 2009, p. 49). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
1. The impact Investment landscape has evolved to a sophisticated global market, awash 
with capital for developing country projects. The perception around returns suggests 
that investors wish to command higher rates of return for Emerging Market projects or 
funds because of the perceived risk. This risk is a combination of political, currency and 
idiosyncratic counterparty risk. These views are driven largely by the negative 
perception associated with Developed Markets. 
2. The spatial distribution in the Gauteng Province was formed by the advent of industrial-
scale mining in the late 1800s and was concretized by apartheid-era laws that saw the 
formation of functional cities and industrial nodes surrounded by white-only suburbs 
with good levels of physical, civil and social infrastructure and remotely located 
residential areas for HDPs’. South Africa’s urban centers are in dire need of spatial re-
43 
 
engineering, the emerging middle class and working class alike must be afforded a 
reasonable chance to access modern amenities and social infrastructure for their 
personal development and for the development of their dependents. Over the last 25 
years, the demographic profile of most middle to upper income suburbs has materially 
changed, with a greater level of diversity owing to the fall of apartheid in the early 1990’s 
and the residential property boom that was charged by economic growth and massive 
retail credit expansion which lasted nearly a decade and was extinguished by the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008. 
3. The affordable or gap housing market, having been largely ignored in the first decade of 
post-apartheid South Africa, has become a salient factor in the growth and mobility of the 
middle class due to a combination of rapid urbanisation in Gauteng and the emergence 
of a swell of households whose incomes rose sharply, beyond the scope of government’s 
low-cost housing programmes. The emergence of specialised lenders and an increased 
level of appetite by property investors and developers to build affordable housing has 
been a welcome development within the residential property market since 2005. Rental 
housing schemes have become increasingly appealing to individual investors/developers 
and private equity investors as demand has been strong since the introduction of the 
National Credit Act and the subsequent Global Financial Crisis. 
4. Greater social impact is achievable for affordable housing impact investors who fund 
developments in areas of greater affluence than areas where the quality of life is better. 
The reporting infrastructure that will allow for benefits to be measured in relation it the 
funds deployed and transaction costs is becoming sophisticated. Investors who are 
amenable to diluting their investment returns for enhanced and accurately measured 
social impact will be a key to unlocking inclusive affordable housing. Developing on land 
that is centrally located, in suburbs that enjoy good access to nodes of employment 
density will create more diverse communities. The deployment of concessionary funding 
to build affordable housing, will be able to keep the rental price stable and affordable in 
the rental market. the current constraint is that building affordable housing schemes in 
such areas that are already adequately resourced vis-à-vis physical infrastructure, 
community resources and amenities is difficult because of the high cost of land- property 
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developers cost usually passed on to end users by means of higher, but feasible, rentals 
charged which make them unaffordable to the gap housing market.  
5. Productivity gains can be achieved through better social, race and class integration, the 
spill-over hypothesis, whose evidence is still largely anecdotal, is a practical and 
observed reality in modern society. Embodied knowledge, which is able to be diffused 
through peer interaction and training can increase firm-level productivity when workers 
infuse their new jobs with the acquired skills and insights gained from past experience 
and collegial interactions. The matching function of economic agents is enhanced when 
proximity between employers and job seekers is decreased.  
6. Centrally located mass housing aids in stemming the growth of peripheral residential 
nodes, it therefore contributing to enhanced efficiency of social and physical 
infrastructure. The failure to bring the growing working class into the city means that 
social services, amenities and infrastructure must be upgraded or developed in the urban 
periphery where population scale and density make such infrastructure upgrades and 
new development inefficient. Furthermore, the ills associated with concentrated poverty 
are worst felt in the peri-urban and rural areas of South Africa, and these more 
concentrated levels of poverty hinder the upliftment of those residents, especially the 






CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & TECHNIQUES 
3.1 Introduction 
This first part of the chapter  sets out the study area and details the sources and types of data 
employed for the inductive formulation of the sought credit risk model. This review is 
important as it establishes the basis for undertaking an assessment of data validitidy.  It then 
outlines the analystical technique for both the design of the experimental data analysis  and 
the proof of concept. The second part of the chapter outlines how the model was built to 
achieve proof of concept. This section describes how model components’ specification as 
well as the importance and how weighting of model variables was achieved. It concludes 
with data and model validation before outlining the key assumptions and limitations faced 
in formulating the model.  
 
3.2 Proposed Methodology 
Batty (2009), a prolific urban spatial modeler, asserts that system dynamics offers a way to 
model the complex relationships and interactions that exist is urban systems or the urban 
dwellers’ way of life, such as transport networks, water and energy supply networks, 
housing infrastructure, social amenities and networks. He further asserts that the 
cornerstone of a well-engineered system dynamics models is its ability to aptly represent 
the results of temporal or moment-in-time processes. For the purpose of this research, 
utilising system dynamics24 models25 would allow the enquiring party to include temporal 
and other idiosyncratic factors to estimate the credit risk of undertaking a loan transaction.  
 
Having reviewed the available existing literature, with particular emphasis on the 
observation that there is a lack of robust literature for credit risk management and modeling 
                                                   
24 A computer-aided approach to understanding and solving dynamic problems that arise in complex (often 
non-linear) systems and phenomena 
25 A model, in the academic arena, is generally considered as a “theoretical abstraction that represents systems 
in such a way that essential features crucial to the theory and its application are identified and highlighted” 
(Batty, 2009, p. 52).  
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in either wholesale banking disbursements or private equity in affordable housing, the 
research is unable to posit a generic or prototype (linear or logit) regression for modeling 
the credit risk associated with financing the housing developments. What the literature was 
able to uncover is that through Basel’s international best-practice framework, much 
discretion is afforded to a competent authority or committee, within a bank or financial 
institution, to create their own probability of default model, provided that the data used to 
refine and calibrate such a model is properly curated and the time period is deemed 
sufficient as to be through-the-cycle and therefore indicative of bull and bear loan 
performance and trends (see Appendix A). The literature has guided the research towards 
the practical reality that modeling credit risk, for high density housing finance, even from an 
impact investor viewpoint would not be able to be undertaken convincingly without loan 
performance data that is both substantial, in variety, and through-the-cycle26 for assessing 
expected default frequency.  
 
The most suitable methodology, given the above description and the lack of extant tools, 
would be to conduct a proof of concept for a modeling framework that could be used to 
assess and manage credit risk using point-in-time27 analysis. A formula would be proposed 
and then be calibrated. The data for such a ranking exercise will be collected through a 
ranking survey. The research will conclude by offering a calibrated formula that has the 
highest level of correlation to the ranking survey to provide to that select group of credit risk 
experts operating in Gauteng.  The research would therefore be a quasi-experimental study. 
 
The SERVE Centre® describes a quasi-experimental study as follows: 
“A comparison of a group that receives a particular intervention with another 
group with similar characteristics that does not receive the intervention. 
where no random assignment is used” (p. 1). 
                                                   
26 Through-the-cycle(TCC) credit data is data which is collected over a number of years-typically greater than 
7 years, which depicts the performance or status of a subject or variable from bullish to bear economic 
conditions and vice-versa.  
27 Point-in-time (PiT) analysis is a method of producing results that are relevant for a particular point in time- 
i.e. a price deemed to be accurate as at today, an example of this are spot rates or prices for commodities.   
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This differs from a purely experimental study only insofar as the removal of random 
assignment. Where it mirrors an experimental design is in its purpose; which is to analyze 
and conclude on whether the proposed intervention caused significant differences to the 
outcomes of the group that received it versus those that did not (SERVE Center at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2008). 
 
The parsimonious and impartial scrutiny of the risks associated with location and the 
prospective counterparty [as the main drivers for assessing such credit risk] could be 
incorporated for assessing risk of funding high density housing schemes. From Batty’s 
(2009) viewpoint, the significance of these factors can be used for obtaining nominal 
property values using preferences of a typical potential buyer. These preferences can be 
modeled in such a way that they make a buyer ask themselves; what am I willing to pay for 
a house with these exact features/characteristics? The cluster of features for this purpose 
represent a willingness to pay- much like a hedonic regression. 
 
3.3 The Study Area 
The unit of analysis for this study is the municipal ward. The study uses data from 336 wards 
composed of Johannesburg’s 130 wards, Tshwane’s 105 wards and Ekurhuleni’s 101 wards. 
Below is map of the study area. 
 






3.4.1 Sources of data 
Primary data was sourced from a select panel of credit risk experts. The format of this expert 
primary data will be a rank-order survey of 10 simulated sample transactions (see Annexure 
H). The subjectivity of the ranking is mitigated by specifying the same type of residential 
scheme in different locations (that have different suburban dynamics) and by specifying 
developers of different experience level and financial standings so that those 3 factors 
become the subject of differentiation (in line with the research design outlined in 3.5.1 
below). As this is a quasi-experimental study, a small number of credit experts were solicited 
to become a panel of expert respondents. 
 
Secondary data was sourced from the GIS metadata of the: 
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▪ GCRO’s 2013 QoL survey data; the Infrastructure Index will be used to draw data for 
assessing property risk (see Annexure E for 2013 QoL Summary documents). 
• Bid-rent model; the original model, which mapped all of Gauteng, will be modified to only 
show the research area bounded by the outer edges of Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg and 
Tshwane (see Annexure D). 
 
The bid-rent model was published in a Government policy document. Although its contents 
are not publicly available, obtaining the metadata was not arduous; it comprised telephoning 
the contractor who undertook the works and it was released. Both secondary data sources 
are not proprietary as they were all commissioned by the Gauteng Provincial government. 
3.4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
For primary data, a scoring template was developed to be used in conjunction with the 
calibrated Probability of Default Ratio (“PDR”) equation below. 
𝑃𝐷𝑅 =
1
1 + 𝑒(𝑎+𝑏 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)
 
Since the “a” and “b” parameters have been established28, the only remaining unknown to be 
solved is the “score”, this will be obtained by ticking the conditionally formatted cells in 
Microsoft Excel® (see Appendix D). The higher the PDR, the higher the associated risk of that 
particular factor.  
 
For secondary data, municipal ward-level GIS metadata (from the municipal wards of the 
study) area are mapped — using quintile intervals — to provide spatial description of the 
respective endogenous property-risks used in modeling.” [see Annexures B and C]. A 
property in a specific ward would score between 1 and 5 on each layer of the GIS, with the 
layers compiled from survey data released by the Gauteng Provincial Government in 2011 
Gauteng Spatial Development Framework and the data released by the GCRO in their 2013 
QoL survey. 
 
                                                   
28 a= 6.0252 and b= 0.16207 (See Annexure I for the detailed calibration calculation). 
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3.5 Choice of Analytical Technique 
Using the scoring template developed in the research, PDR can be established for each 
proposed residential property development; this is provided that all of the relevant 
information is collected prior to undertaking the exercise. 
 
The correlation between the aggregated expert ranking and the rankings emanating from 
the simulated sample transactions PDR formula/model must be a minimum of 0.5 in order 
to reject the null hypothesis. The respective PDRs of all the simulated sample transactions 
were ranked using Microsoft Excel’s® in ascending order. 
3.5.1 Experimental research design  
A fractional factorial design was undertaken; non-equivalent groups design is undertaken on 
the primary data collection. Since a panel of credit experts is sought only a small subset of 
the already niche community of trained financial risk management professionals are eligible 
as credit risk experts in this research. 
- The credit risk expert’s opinions were ‘aggregated’ by way of a consensus ranking exercise 
performed over the outcomes of their individual and confidential rankings (see Annexure 
A). 
- The formula for calculating the PDR will be composed of quantitative and qualitative 
factors, therefore a mixed methodology will be used. 
 
The said panel of credit experts is given identical simulated specimen transactions. From the 
simulated transactions, experts were to rank transaction from most to least suitable vis-à-
vis the inherent credit risk and their potential for positive social impact. The same specimen 
transactions are then run through the proposed formula. Correlation, of minimum of 0.5, 
between the proposed formula and the aggregated opinions of a panel of credit risk experts 




This was done as a Resolution IV29, fractional factorial design. These sample transactions 
depict: 
- Gearing ratios (loan-to-value ratio and loan-to-cost ratio); 
- Neighbourhood and locality attributes of where the subject property is; 
- Financial standings of the proposed borrower; 
- Property development experience of the developer; and 
- Predicted cash flow and investment yield of the proposed development. 
 
Each sample transaction is (i) in a different location (within the study area), (ii) “proposed” 
by a different developer with different levels of experience and financial standings, and (iii) 
has a marginally different cost structure and yields different investment returns. The type of 
property development, however, is the same for all the different locations, a 150-unit triple-
storey apartment complex (see Annexure F). This was done so as to not be an influencing 
factor in the research.  
 
The fractional data to create or drive a robust model of this type would primarily be loan-
specific and counterparty data collected by banks and non-bank financiers30  that advance 
loan funding for affordable housing or middle-of-the-marker residential property. This data 
would be proprietary and highly confidential, thus not obtainable to be used in research as 
this one. Would it ever happen that such data could be released to any party outside of the 
respective organization, it would need to be extensively processed to remove personal 
particulars of counterparties or any other identifying characteristics. 
3.5.2 Proof of Concept 
A proof of concept for an impact investment based credit-scoring model was undertaken. The 
ultimate aim was to create an equation to perform credit-risk assessment. This assessment 
formula is expected to provide an overall score for the quality of counterparty credit risk. 
                                                   
29  A design of experiment (DOE) resolution that allows the main effects to be confounded with 3-way 
interactions- being cash flow risk, property risk and borrower risk. http://support.minitab.com/en-
us/minitab/17/topic-library/modeling-statistics/doe/factorial-designs/what-is-a-design-resolution/  
30 All licensed by the Financial Services Board of South Africa. 
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The overall score is then calculated using the expert-based multi-factor formula approach 
and is expected to be presented in the form of a PDR.  
 
As a proof of concept was being undertaken, the proposed credit risk assessment model is 
intended for use by non-bank financiers of affordable housing schemes in the sample area, 
that is, the three metropolitan municipalities of Gauteng Province. The USA’s National 
Archives describes a proof of concept as follows: 
A project or undertaking demonstrates proof of concept (“PoC”) when it shows that 
its theory can survive application in reality or to prove the feasibility of either a 
solution, or a critical aspect of a solution. In terms of a product or goods, a proof of 
concept is often a functional prototype. 
 
A PoC is undertaken to demonstrate functionality rather than to reveal performance. It is 
successful when it can give the following clarity on the proposed technology/methodology: 
a) Will it meet the user’s needs? 
b) Can it perform as publicized? 
c) Can the prospective end user(s) enjoy enhanced productivity having utilised it? 
d) Will the ultimate solution be feasible? (United States Government, 2006). 
The graphic below depicts a whole project lifecycle and that PoC is at the very beginning. 
Figure 8: Proof of Concept Development flow-chart 
 




The salient constituents for conducting a PoC are: 
a) Defining the criteria for success— this definition should be derived from the possible end 
users and decision-makers and these criteria should be explicit; 
b) What follows next to determine the success or failure of the PoC is the evaluation of the 
solution that has been engineered against the defined success criteria;  
c) The decision to proceed beyond the PoC stage to a full undertaking to engage in the project 
or to not proceed as “proof” was not achieved, the results may be unanimously for or 
against the defined criteria or partially in favour of it. The decision to not proceed is also 
a binding measure of the success of a PoC and proves that the undertaking is not feasible. 
An unsuccessful PoC is one where the success criteria were inappropriate or the test cases 
were lacking in detail and therefore gave inconclusive outcomes in relation to the defined 
success criteria. During the course of creating the proposed solution in a PoC the focus is 
on quick results, tinkering, and calibration rather than thoughtful and methodological 
configurations; for this reason, changes and iterations are not tracked, but, rather, only 
the net or final result is necessary to publicize. 
 
What follows are the steps involved in proofing concept in this research: 
1. Introduction of the proposed undertaking 
 
The purpose of this research is to derive a credit risk analysis formula and prove its 
practicability. It is meant for the non-bank funding of high-density affordable rental 
housing developments (long-term mortgage secured lending). The area under study is the 
metropolitan cities of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane in Gauteng province. These 
metropolitan cities are contiguous. The formula is intended for use by financiers who 
subscribe to an impact investment philosophy with the aim to generate triple-bottom line 
returns for the investments they undertake.  
 
This formula forms only the foundation of credit risk analysis for this particular type of 
secured lending. The property risk related components of the formula are designed to be 
used in conjunction with a four-layer GIS. Although slightly dated (the available Bid-rent 
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Model data was released in 2011), survey data is used to create new area quality indices 
to rank endogenous property-related risks. The respective municipal wards, where each 
simulated sample transaction, falls within becomes the unit of measure. 
 
The formula is to be driven by the: 
a) strength and reliability of cash flow from tenants/occupants of the completed 
affordable housing renal scheme,  
b) financial standing of actual approved loan obligors; and  
c) salient transaction details such as appraised property value, capitalization rates 
applied to value, equity provided by loan obligor, nature and value collateral, or loan. 
It will also be portfolio invariant31. 
 
The PoC undertaken utilised simulated data for sample loan transactions that was first 
adjudicated and ranked by credit experts in the Gauteng residential development 
financing sector. The baseline formula’s explanatory variables will be calibrated.  
 
Expert ranking is a credible measure of credit risk assessment when data are either not 
available or poorly constructed and/or curated. They are favoured because they are 
fundamentally premised on trade-offs between both signaling (signals) and noise (error 
term). Subject-matter experts in a field are deemed to be the least influenced by noise and 
therefore best able to adjudge the trade-off based on signals. These signals become 
indicators that take primacy in how experts assign risk and therefore rank multiple 
proposed transactions. 
 
This proposed method makes several assumptions regarding the level of proficiency and 
knowledge concerning affordable housing development finance and credit risk analysis. 
A financing agency may possess adequate systems for deal making, loan implementation 
and loan/client maintenance. Assumptions, inter-alia, are that the financiers have: 
                                                   
31 the risk level for any given loan is to depend only on the risk of that loan and not also on the portfolio to 
which that loan is added. This is how Basel !! recommends that counterparty risk be measured and such method 
is referred to as ratings-based risk analysis. 
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a) created awareness among operational staff as to the importance of records 
management and curating; 
b) encouraged consistent record keeping behaviour among staff and procured Enterprise 
Resource Management systems with requisite flexibility for effective record keeping; 
and 
c) an understanding of affordable housing development finance (purpose, components, 
and functionality). 
 
2. Planning the Successful Proof of Concept Study 
 
A study was conducted to affirm that an equation is able to be developed to simulate 
expert-level decision making around credit risk assessment for decision making for 
funding high density affordable housing projects. 
 
a) The purpose 
The prototype credit risk assessment is an expert-driven model for calculating the 
likelihood of counterparty default for a single secured senior debt loan used to finance 
a new high-density affordable housing rental apartment scheme. The goal is to develop 
a multi-factor equation with a high correlation to a ranking question analysis 
completed by expert credit risk professionals in the field of residential property 
development finance. 
 
The objectives of the proof of concept were: 
(i) To adapt excerpts of the non-proprietary 2013 Quality of Life Survey (conducted 
by the GCRO) and use them as the risk drivers in an impact investment risk 
assessment tool for affordable housing development finance.  
(ii) To calculate and assign a percentage of loan default probability on each sample 
transaction using a probability of default interpolation formula from Basel II’s 
Internal Ratings Based System (see Appendix A for Basel II IBR summary).  
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(iii) To correspondingly rank a batch of 10 simulated building loan transactions of the 
property type- namely a 150-unit apartment block for the rental market, the block 
is assumed to be built in a single phase.  
(iv) The ranking will be done using the loan default probability as the unit of analysis.   
 
b) Establishing Success Criteria 
The Bank for International Settlements asserts that correlation of 0.5 or more indicates 
that a model performs without discriminative power and therefore has an appropriate 
level of explanatory ability. A correlation of 1 indicates the model performs perfectly. 
Correlation is sufficient in a model when lies “between 0.5 and 1.0 for any reasonable 
rating model in practice”(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2005, p38) 
 
c) Outlining the Benefits of the Prototype   
The formula’s ability to align to the expert ranking will outline its ability to accurately 
ascribe the extent of credit risk inherent in financing an affordable housing scheme. 
 
The use of GIS and current data collected to indicate the quality of life in the contiguous 
study area means the variables driving the quality of the environment a new housing 
scheme is located in will become tractable and evidence-based. The GIS metadata is 
obtained from the GCRO’s 2013 Quality of Life survey and the Gauteng Provincial 
Department of Economic Development’s Gauteng Spatial Development Framework 
policy document. The GIS is a critical part of measuring the property-related risk of a 
proposed loan transaction. 
 
The goal of the research is that the formula leads to a more precise understanding of 
counterparty credit risk which, in turn, will lead to a higher number of high quality 
deals being approved for funding in an unbiased manner. The formula is also expected 
to convey a more transparent manner in which concessionary loans are granted and 
how financing costs can be reduced to make high quality deals. The quality of a deal, as 
is the norm, is adjudicated by (i) the financial standing and experience of the 
counterparty [the borrower], (ii) the expected quality and specification of the 
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completed housing project; and (iii) the location of the proposed project vis-à-vis the 
appeal it will garner from the rental market. This appeal is expected not only to keep 
vacancy (loss of potential cash flow for servicing loan) down, but be an indicator of the 
social and environmental benefit of the project and how it is captured by its target 
market. 
 
Moody’s Investor Services, whose definitions will be used as the benchmark for 
assigning counterparty risk, offers the following broad definitions for the rank of credit 
risk bands which may be assign to a particular transaction or counterparty. 
  
d) Defining the Scope 
The scope of the research is to ascribe a specific level of credit risk to a proposal to 
undertake loan funding for an affordable housing rental project. Through inductive 
reasoning a formula for loan default probability estimating will be created and 
calibrated for accuracy using results from an expert ranking survey. 
 
The following aspects of the study will be conducted and explained in sections 4.2 and 4.3 
of chapter 4, respectively.  Aspects:  
e) Conducting the Pilot; and  
f) Evaluating the Pilot. 
Concluding with aspects which will be conducted and explained in chapter 5, namely: 
g) Key Outcomes; 
h) Lessons learned; and  
i) Summary. 
 
3.6 Model Specification 
The research will begin by proposing a scoring model The model is to be stochastic in nature 
with the following definition being provided on the broader field that stochastic model exist 
in:  “A statistical model is a probability distribution constructed to enable inferences to be 
drawn or decisions made from data. This idea is the basis of most tools in the statistical 




The scoring model created using Microsoft Excel® for the three credit risk fundamentals of 
any investment property transaction; these credit risks are quantitative and qualitative and 
are regarded as best practice by risk managers in South African property financiers— the 
so-called big 5 commercial banks. 32 These are: 
a) Property risk (specification of the proposed property development). 
b) Cash flow (the reliability & of projected cash flow that will service the loan). 
c) Borrower/Obligor risk (the specific counterparty risk) 
 
A formula of the credit scoring equation is provided in generic form: 
 𝑃𝐷𝑅 = 𝑓𝑖(β𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑖 +  β𝑩𝑋𝐵𝑖 +  β𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑖) 
Where:    XA represents Property risk (calibrated PD calculation score from Basel II) 
XB represents Cash flow risk (calibrated PD calculation score from Basel II) 
XC represents Borrower default probability risk (Altman’s Z”-Score©) 
 
These three risks will be individually analyzed and weighted to give a final score for the one-
year holistic credit risk rating of the entire proposed affordable housing project.  
 
The PDR is a point-in-time transaction risk measure (measuring the stand-alone risk of the 
probability of counterparty default) for a proposed loan and becomes a random variable (or 
stochastic variable) on the day of capital disbursement. This is because it is a variable whose 
value is subject to variations that are due to chance and therefore does not have a single, 
fixed value (even if unknown). It can take on a set of possible different values, each with an 
associated probability. This PDR variable is therefore a continuous random variable as it may 
assume any numerical value in an interval of 0, 01 to 100% projected default probability.  
                                                   
32 Big 5 Banks- The Standard Bank of South Africa, ABSA Bank (aka Barclays Africa), First National Bank, 
Nedbank and Investec Bank. 
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i. Property risk ratio- Cross-referencing the GIS data, where risk drivers are determined by 
the GCRO’s and Gauteng Provincial Government’s Indexed maps, for the particular location 
of the proposed development site; 
ii. cash flow risk ratio- the ICR and developer experience of each simulate sample transaction; 
and 
iii. borrower-level risk- adjudged from summary of financial standings of each proposed 
developer (Group/Firm-level financials) which have been processed to determine their 
respective Altman’s Z’’-score. 
 
The Impact Investment principles and gains expanded upon in the literature review (Chapter 
2) will be incorporated into the “property risk” section. This section has a large weight in the 
total score for transaction to be financed. A summary of Moody’s ratings categories is 
provided as Annexure G with the salient information provided below. 
 
Moody’s ratings translated to probability of default ratings: 
Table 2- Moody's credit rating notches(summarized) 
Investment grade High Yield- speculative 
grade 
Highly speculative Substantial Risk  
Rating Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Ca C 
PD 0.42% 0.71% 1.21% 2.12% 3.76% 6.82% 12.61% 12.62% to 23.8% 
Source- Moody's Investor Services (2001) 
 
The probability of default (PD) percentages from the above table will be adopted as the 
upper and lower bund estimates for the calibration in this research. The calibration itself 
(see Annexure I) is done with a lower-bound limit of one notch above the PD commensurate 
with the sovereign rating of South Africa, this being Baa3 and therefore 0.042% PD. The 
upper-bound limit is the PD commensurate with the last and therefore worst possible 




The calibration equation used in the property and the cash flow risks are explained below in 
i and ii, while the Altman’s Z”-Score will not be calibrated— it’s taken as-is and explained in 
point iii. 
 
i. The score for the property risk will be attained my means of a multivariate weighted 
average formula; each variable is either a quantitative or qualitative endogenous factor 
that adds or removes property-related risk. Each variable will be grouped into quintiles 
and receive a score assigned from a scoring rubric. The maximum value for the score shall 
be +10 and the minimum value shall be -10 with a rating scale of Superior through to Poor 
and a weighting attached to each factor. 
 
Table 3- Rating Scale and scoring values offered by the research 
Band Superior Good Average Below Average Poor 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value (translation of 
score into formula) 
10 5 0 -5 -10 
 
The variables that drive the property risk factor are driven by data obtained from 
publicly-owned GIS metadata. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 =  𝑓(β1𝑋1𝑖 + β𝟐𝑋2𝑖 + β3𝑋3𝑖 + β𝟒𝑋4𝑖 +  β𝟓𝑋5𝑖) 
Where: 
X1i  is Loan-to-value (LTV) representing the gearing ratio; 
X2i  is Bid-rent Index (demarcated by municipal ward); 
X3i  is Suburb Quality (demarcated by municipal ward); 
X4i  is Quality of Service Delivery (demarcated by municipal ward); and  
 
X5i  is Condition of improvements to the land. 
 
The scores of the independent endogenous factors, except X1 as (LTV), will be obtained 
from ward-level sample data collected in any of the three aforementioned GIS database 




ii. The score for cash flow risk will be measured with respect to the interest cover ratio 
(“ICR”) and development management experience (measured in years) for the 
sustainability of the cash flows.   
 
The ICR takes into account the ratio of normalised annual net cash flow (obtained from 
the valuation report) and cumulative annual interest at a benchmark interest rate of 
50 basis points above the prime-lending rate (obtained from an amortization schedule). 
 
Table 4- ICR rating scale and intervals 
Rating Superior Good Average Below Average Poor 
Band 1.95 <x 1.8 <x≤ 1.95 1.65 <x≤ 1.8 1.5 <x≤ 1.65 1<x≤1.5 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value of Score 10 5 0 -5 -10 
 
The developer’s experience will be scored as follows: 
 
Table 5- Developer's experience rating scale and intervals 
Rating Superior Good Acceptable Unproven Poor 
Band (years) 10 ≤ x 6 < x ≤ 9 4 < x ≤ 6 2< x ≤ 4 2 ≤ x 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value of Score 10 5 0 -5 -10 
 
Note: The total score achieved for cash flow risk will be the arithmetic mean of the two 
scores which will fall into a range of between -10 (minimum) and +10(maximum).  
 
iii. Analysis of Borrower risk being analyzed using Altman’s 2002 revised Z”-Score model 
for non-manufacturing and emerging market companies 33 . The formula uses 
multivariate discriminant analysis with through-the-cycle data collected over many 
decades. This is a renowned and globally utilised formula for predicting the probability 
                                                   
33 Altman’s original Z-Score formula was for publically listed manufacturing companies in 1968 in the USA 
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of business default/ bankruptcy. This research will not use discriminate analysis as is 
the normal outcome of running the model, where classifications are: “high probability of 
default” is indicated by a Z”-score below 1.1; a “low probability of default” is indicated 
by a score above 2.6; and the “gray area” is where the score lies between the 
aforementioned categories. Instead the score in this research will be standardised to a 
probability to PDR = (1 – p-value).   
 
The Z”-Score formula, to be used for borrower risk assessment, is expressed as follows: 
𝑍 = 6.56 (
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) + 3.26 (
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) + 6.72 (
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠




Source: InvestingAnwers.com (n.d.) 
 
The utilization of this formula gives a rational number- the Z”-score. We substitute a 
corresponding probability from the Cumulative Normal Distribution Table- because this 
is a one-tail z-test to the right, the standardized Z”-Score denotes is the likelihood of NOT 
being bankrupt. The default probability, is therefore 1-probability value. 
Table 6- Altman's Z"-score and intervals 
Rating Safe On alert Moderate risk High risk 
Z”-score 3≤ x 2.7 < x ≤ 2.99 2.7≤ x <1.8  x ≤ 1.8 
 
3.7 Measurement variables 
3.7.1 The loan-to-value variable measuring the facet of gearing and solvency  
The extent to which a lender can possibly recover at-risk funds when a built property or 
upcoming development begins to deteriorate is largely driven by the price with which a new 
would-be buyer (who would be buying the distressed property) would pay for that property. 
The higher the initial gearing— the market value over the loan amount—  the higher the 
likelihood that a financier would be unable to recover their full outstanding amount as a 
distressed property is often bought at a discount. 
Table 7- LTV scoring and intervals 
Rating Superior Good Average Below average Poor 
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LTV ratio 0.5≤ x 0.5 < x ≤ 0.65 0.65 < x ≤0.7 0.7 x ≤ 0.75 0.75< x 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value of 
Score 
10 5 0 -5 -10 
3.7.2 Bid-rent Index variable measuring the suburb quality facet  
As part of the 2011 Gauteng Spatial Development Framework, a study was conducted for the 
Gauteng Provincial Economic Development department to ascribe value to land — whether 
vacant or built on — was done to assess the suitability of land for various public and private 
sector interventions.  This study was undertaken largely to establish areas of high-value, 
high-growth potential and to indicate areas where development — for residential, social or 
commercial purposes — would be unsuitable. Is uses a vast array of factors from physical 
geography to proximity to social and lifestyle amenities to map desirability and 
“developability” of a piece of land (See Annexure D). This location aspect, in property 
financing, is a critical component of the proposed investment as it rewards [and penalizes] a 
developer based on how well the location of their development will be as well as provide 
immediate and future developmental benefits tenants will enjoy as a result of staying there. 
 
A proposed property development will be placed on a bid-rent curve whose gradient is 
unique to the particular area or district where the proposed property development is located. 
The bid-rent curve effectively represents the urban potential of any given point relative to 
its position within the current and future urban structure; it is based on urban fundamentals 
such as accessibility, the level of current infrastructure development, and the nature of any 





Table 8- Bid-rent model scoring and intervals 
Rating Superior Good Average Below average Poor 
Bid-rent index 0.5≤ x 0.45≤ x < 0.5 0.35≤ x <0.45 0.25≤ x < 0.35 x < 0.25 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value of Score 10 5 0 -5 -10 
3.7.3 The “Quality of roads Index” variable measuring the facet of accessibility 
The accessibility has been expressed either as the potential of a given zone to be reached by 
other agents (passive accessibility) or as the potential to reach the other agents (active 
accessibility) from a given zone. Most cities in developing countries lack well-planned transit 
access for low-income communities. Affordable housing located near public mass transit can 
help low-income residents save money, access better jobs, schools and health facilities and 
reach critical community services (Brisson & Duerr 2014). 
 
Formulated from the GCRO’s 2013 QoL survey, accessibility index was particularly useful 
for the assessment of the physical state of the existing roads and storm-water systems and 
the extent to which residents were satisfied with the capacity of the road network in their 
respective neighbourhoods. 
Table 9- Quality of Roads index scoring and intervals 
Rating Superior Good Average Below average Poor 
Qual. of roads 0.6 ≤ x 0.5≤ x < 0.6 0.4 ≤ x <0.5 0.3 ≤ x < 0.4 x < 0.3 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value of Score 10 5 0 -5 -10 
3.7.4 The “Quality of Service Delivery” variable measuring the facet of 
neighbourhood satisfaction 
Being cognisant of the nature of civil disobedience by communities and the discord in local 
councils that often fuels such disobedience, it is incumbent, from a risk management view, 
to incorporate such (dis)satisfaction as it may have material effect on tenant demand and 
even property value. Areas prone to such civil disobedience are characterized by general 
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underdevelopment or urban decay of social and physical infrastructure; this acts as a 
deterrent to potential tenants when considering leasing a dwelling in one such 
neighbourhood over another that may be more placid. 
 
This variable was formulated by the researched from survey results focusing on service 
delivery (roads, sanitation, environmental management and electricity). All the individual 
scores were averaged to obtain a quality of service delivery final score. 
Table 10- Quality of Service Delivery scoring and intervals 
Rating Superior Good Average Below average Poor 
Qual. of service 
delivery 
0.9≤ x 0.75≤ x < 0.9 0.6≤ x <0.75 0.45≤ x < 0.6 x < 0.45 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value of Score 10 5 0 -5 -10 
3.7.5 The “Condition/ Specification of Improvements” variable measured by the 
NHBRC and EDGE® Standards and Codes 
The building condition of the proposed scheme will be assessed by making a relevant quintile 
in the rubric. A score of “Good” denotes a brand-new development to be build according to 
building guidelines as proposed by the NHBRC. 
A score of “Superior” shall be applicable to a building that satisfies the NHBRC’s guidelines 
and further demonstrates certification to the GBCSA34’s EDGE®35 Multi-Unit Residential V136 
Framework. 
  
                                                   
34  Green Building Council of South Africa (GBCSA)— a voluntary body advancing resource efficiency in 
construction and engineering 
35 Excellence in Design for Greater Efficiencies (EDGE) is a GBCSA certification programme, launched in 2015 
to empower the residential property market to design and build resource-efficient buildings. 




Table 11- Condition of improvements scoring and intervals 







Newly built to 
NHBRC specification 
Existing property renovated 
to NHBRC specification 
N/A N/A 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
Value of Score 10 5 0 -5 -10 
 
3.8 Model Validation 
Correlation between the rankings provided by the panel of credit experts is sought to 
establish that the formula will be useful in indicating expert-level decision making. If there 
is no or very weak correlation between the experts, then there is no way to attempt to 
replicate or approximate that expert thinking because it would mean that all or most of the 
experts are assessing and prioritizing different risk factors when making decisions on 
approving or rejecting loan applications.  
 
The “consensus ordinal ranking system” used assumes m rankings of n objects, the m 
rankings are aggregated and represent what’s considered the consensus opinion? The 
method is used because most general forms of aggregating rankings produce inferior results 
as they aren’t effective in overcoming two certain aggregate rank problems, Emond and 
Mason (2002) assert that these problem typically permit: 
• ties between objects to occur;  
• the relative dominance of individual rankings to be reflected, usually in the form of 
numerical weights. 
This method is chosen in this instance as it effectively overcomes the consensus ranking 
problem. As a scoring method, it’s designed to prevent the overall views of the whole panel 
from being negated or over-ruled by a single judge/adjudicator/panelist who has a widely 
differing view. It does this by taking point swings or distance, in this case rank points, out of 




A method called the Garret Ranking Method was also contemplated.  It was found unsuitable 
because it uses a Garret-score table, which resembles a normal distribution Z-table or T-table 
(for establishing a p-value), the researcher was unable to find a suitable way to interpolate 
values that lay between two data points. The intervals for the data points were not as narrow 
as a Z-table so much of the ranking organised by this method lay between the data points 
and the accuracy of the rankings become compromised. 
 
Once correlation is established between the expert rankings- using Kendall’s Coefficient of 
Concordance (or Kendall’s W), a consensus expert ranking will be derived. This and the 
results obtained from using the formula over all the simulated transaction will then be 
analyzed for to establish their Spearman’s Correlation (or Spearman’s rho) where the 
minimum acceptable value to prove correlation is 0.5. Therefore, we propose the null 
hypothesis is “true” if spearman’s correlation is equal to 0.5. Alternatively, we will find the 
null hypothesis “not true” if spearman’s correlation is equal to or greater than 0.5. 
 
Lastly, the Kruskal-Wallis H-test is used to assess whether or not there is a statistically 
significant difference in the means of the two sets of non-parametric rank-order data; it’s 
favoured as it was the most appropriate method of validation of non-parametric data as it 
most closely resembles the one-tailed ANOVA. 
  
3.9 Data Validation 
Data validation will be two-fold. The first validation will be that of the sample data received 
from the ranking order survey. This data is to be obtained from 6 respondents who serve as 
the pane of experts. The experts will all confidentially do their ranking survey. In order to 
assess the validity of creating a formula to assess credit risk the way experts do, the research 
must first establish a level of correlation between the expert judgement; this to ensure that 
consensus exits within their thinking. If consensus can be established, then the expert data 
can be aggregated to produce an average expert ranking for the simulated sample deals. 
If the correlation is below 0.5, then there is limited or no consensus between the experts and 




This second stage of validation is useful to establish “criterion validity”. This type of validity 
can look at how the observed values determined by the model tie up with measurable and 
validated values of the expert rankings.  As a statistical exercise, criterion validation has to 
be done through sensible analyses of good-quality data- hence the first stage of validation 
(Wilson & Stern 2001). 
 
To create an element of replicability in any risk assessment it is important to have the same, 
or very similar, criteria being evaluated. How we weigh those criteria against our final 
decision can either be the same- indicating an objective measure, or different- indicating a 
subjective measure. 
 
In the case of credit risk in real estate finance, one might say that if a prospective borrower 
wants debt funding to erect a certain type of building in an area, and the financier doesn’t 
wish to have exposure in such area/node, then it is a non-starter. When no appetite exists, 
there can be no deal on the table, no matter the financial standing or level of experience. In 
such a situation, this would be a subjective matter as it completely disregards any other 
possible merits of the prospective transaction. Should the same client take the very same 
deal to another financier who also disapproves of the area, but is willing to weigh the risk 
associated with that area uses an objective measure. The variables used in this research aim 
to remove the subjectivity and bias attributed with even expert thinking and provide a 
factual analysis of an area vis-à-vis its suitability for high-density residential development. 
 
The data is qualitative and quantitative in nature. Below are all the variables driving the 
calculation of the PDR. 
 
Property developer’s Experience:  
The property developer’s experience is a measure of the reliance of the projected net cash 
flow to service the loan. It is therefore a measure of how sustainable the anticipated cash 
flows from the property are and an indication of whether the developer can build a project 
of good specifications so as to keep tenant demand and occupancy high and contain 
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maintenance costs, which would erode net cash flow. Experienced developers have rental 
management systems for arrear management, marketing experience and networks to 
guarantee optimal occupancy and tenant replacement. Without these systems, the potential 
to collect the projected rental income is placed in jeopardy. 
Borrower risk (default probability) 
Since its first publication this formula has been the subject of perennial scrutiny, but it has 
empirically proven itself to be a capable tool as the data it is founded upon is extensive. In 
2009, the third edition was unveiled, named the Z”-Score model and tailored for non-
manufacturing, emerging markets and private firms. This Z”-Score model has not yet gained 
traction in the finance industry both in the USA and globally. Literature is scarce and for this 
reason it will not be used.  
 
Morningstar Inc.37, undertook a study in 2009 to gauge the effectiveness of Altman’s models 
in comparison to a competing methodology for default probability, namely Merton’s Option-
Pricing Model (1973). Merton’s model is used to calculate a so-called “Distance to Default” 
and the ubiquitous, yet very rudimentary Total Liabilities : Total Assets ratio used only for 
companies deemed to have very low likelihood of default such as blue chips. 
 
The results were as follows: While the Distance to Default of the Merton’s Model has a higher 
accuracy ratio, some difficulties exist in utilizing it, especially for small firms, difficulties that 
the Z-Score doesn’t have. The first difficulty is that Merton’s model assumes that all the firm’s 
assets are dispatch-able to settle outstanding debt, which in reality we know it not to be the 
case. The second is that Merton’s model also needs an accurate value for the standard 
deviation which is ascribed to a firm. This is only really possible with a business listed on an 
exchange, so private companies are precluded. The Z”-Score methodology performs almost 
as well as Distance to Default up until the 75th percentile and then begins to weaken.  An 
Accuracy Ratio (correlation) of 0.6 however, is respectable and largely regarded as a 
functional fit as it surpasses the least acceptable correlation for functionality which is 0.5. 
                                                   
37 A global leader in independent financial and investment research and advisory services (Headquartered in 




3.10 Study Assumptions 
1) The end user (consumer) is rational and seeks to maximize their utility, within their 
respective budget constraint, by exercising their preference as to where they live in 
relation to where they work, shop, school, etc. The area they choose is deemed to be 
the one that maximizes their utility (i.e., the location utility), decision processes is 
therefore based on Random Utility Maximization (“RUM”) (Coppola & Nuzzolo 2011, 
p. 64). Consistent with the RUM principles we assume the utility is a random variable 
consisting of two terms: the systematic utility and the random residuals. This is in 
respect to:  
a) the cost of accommodation (land rent);  
b) seeking to minimize travel distance to and from work (addressing private and 
public transportation needs); 
c) seeking to minimize the distance to and from everyday amenities; and 
d) if they have dependents, seeking to minimize their proximity to schooling. 
 
  
Source- Miller (2009) 
Figure 9: Performance of credit risk analysis methods 
71 
 
2) The model itself is developed under the following key assumptions:  
 
a) That land is homogenous and therefore its price is determined by the value of 
highest and best use and its proximity to economically vibrant nodes with 
strong demand for job seekers; 
b) The number of end users (consumers of affordable housing) is discrete; 
c) That competition for land acquisition is perfect - that the buyer and seller reach 
a Pareto-optimal selling price; 
d) That the secured loan to finance the development will be denominated in ZAR 
(“R”) and that the necessary forex hedging is in place, undertaken as a zero-sum 
game between counterparties and maintained throughout finance term; 
e) That building costs, relative to design and specification/finishes, is the same 
throughout Johannesburg; 
f) That the developer will retain all the improved property for the duration of the 
finance term (until senior debt fully amortizes); 
g) That the developer will keep rental within the Department of Human 
Settlements’ definition of Affordable Housing; and 
h) The developer and financier(s) are explicitly engaged in the affordable housing 
market and are operating for the pursuit of a triple bottom line. 
 
3.11 Study Limitations 
Studies focusing on the modeling of the economic process associated with land use change 
are temporal. As such, they are considered subjective, from the point where the researcher 
begins to collect data. From this vantage point, it is argued that these models are primarily 
“ad hoc,” developed without an economic theoretical framework, and therefore are 
susceptible to certain conceptual and estimation problems (Irwin & Geoghegan 2001, p. 7). 
 
The practical use of this formula should eliminate bias in credit risk assessment that 
emanates from ‘decisions by committee’ or ‘group think’. It offers a replicable method of 
unbiased analysis. Its limitation is that it is validated by means of rank order correlation and 
therefore governed by the extent to which signaling plays a role in each expert’s ranking; 
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with signaling the expert decides on the basis of his/her own signal only. The rankings are 
confidential and the research has not gone on to investigate whether the expert would have 
read the signaling any differently if they had seen the anonymous rankings of other experts? 
Would they rationally choose to discard it and possibly stick to the wrong ranking? Does 
ranking done in isolation carry more weight than consultative ranking where the signaling 
seen by others plays a role in better decision-making (Duranton & Puga 2004, p. 2104)? 
Below are common pitfalls of modeling, and their generic solutions, the model sought by the 
research may is designed along the principles espoused in the solutions: 
  
Table 12: Modeling Pitfalls 
73 
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses and presents the result of the study. The results are provided to 
satisfy whether the concept has indeed been proven; it provides the basis on which 
conclusion(s) and recommendations will be formulated.  Section 4.2 explains the level of 
correlation that existed between the rankings given by the experts; this correlation was 
important to signify whether there was a meeting of the minds in terms of expert thinking in 
order to begin to seek a way of modeling that thinking. Section 4.3 would be the establishing 
or calibrating the weightings for the variables that would give rise to the null hypothesis of 
the research being rejected or failed to be rejected. 
 
4.2 Conducting the Pilot 
Having set out the variables and the related parameters and intervals, the small-scale 
piloting of the model was undertaken to assess its functionality. Such functionality would be 
determined by the model’s ability to discern varying outcomes or results for a variety 
simulated transactions with varying risk drivers. Here the model was to discern just how 
much risk lay in funding each simulated housing project based on its individual attributes as 
risk factors. These individual attributes ranged from the financial standing of the obligor, the 
amount of loan funding that was needed in relation to the projected market value of each 
particular development, the projected net cash flow, which would pay back the loan to the 
risks associated with each neighbourhood that the housing project would be located within. 
4.2.1 Exploratory Data Analysis  
Since affordable housing finance is a voluntary commitment to the Financial Sector Charter38, 
all banks that undertake to engage in it do so to primarily fulfil the objective of the Charter’s 
                                                   
38  The Codes of the Financial Sector Charter (the Charter) commits all participants to actively promote a 
transformed, vibrant and globally competitive financial sector that reflects the demographics of South Africa, 
and which contributes to the establishment of an equitable society by providing accessible financial services to 
black people and by directing investment into targeted sectors of the economy.  
The Charter came into effect in January 2004 as a result of agreements reached at the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) Financial Sector Summit in August 2002. NEDLAC is the 
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codes, which are in alignment with the principle of socially responsible investing. As such all 
commercial banks therefore fulfil the broad definition of ‘impact investors’ insofar as it 
pertains to affordable housing development finance. 
 
Findings from Non-Parametric Data Analysis 
A decision was taken to have the ranking exercise undertaken in separate interviews with 
the experts to make the rankings confidential; this would ensure that there was no coerced 
or “manufactured” consensus— what one would find if rankings were done using the Delphi 
Technique, for example. The data collected from the expert panel rankings was assessed for 
correlation or the extent to which the experts agreed in their rankings, this was done using 
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance [or Kendall’s W, as its commonly known] (see Annexure 
A) which, as the name suggests, assesses the extent to which multiple judges or participants 
agree with each other’s respective responses to the same phenomena. The level or 
concordance was revealed to be ≈68,6% indicating a strong measure of agreement. 
Table 13: Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance 
 
 
The Consensus Ordinal Ranking System was used to formulate panel-wide expert ranking. The 
consensus ordinal ranking method (see Annexure B) established consensus ranking, among 
all the experts, for the 10 simulated sample transactions. The following simulated deals are 
arranged from most favourable to least favourable. Below are the results. 
Table 14: Results of consensus ordinal ranking 
 
                                                   
multilateral forum which brings together Government, Business, Labour and Community constituencies to 









Deal 3 Deal 6 Deal 10 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 4 Deal 9 Deal 5
Consensus 
rank
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
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4.2.2 Model Calibration and Results 
Solving for a ρ>0.5 and therefore rejecting the null hypothesis of ρ=0.5 required an iterative 
process experiment to obtain an optimal correlation, where the weighting of the three risks 
and the weighting of the variables which drove the risks were modified until the Spearman’s 
rho of the ranked results of the model and the ranked results of the aggregated expert panel 
surpassed the acceptable level, which was set at a value of 0.5. 
 
Apart from the Altman Z”-Score variable (which has four intervals), five intervals for the 
scoring of credit risk were chosen ranging from “poor” to “superior” and were separately 
depicted in section 3.5 and 3.6. Below is the consolidated table: 
Table 15-Property risk matric (all) with intervals 
Rating Superior Good Average Below 
average 
Poor 
LTV ratio 0.5≤ x 0.5 < x ≤ 0.65 0.65 < x ≤0.7 0.7< x ≤ 0.75 0.75< x 
Bid-rent index 0.5≤ x 0.45≤ x < 0.5 0.35≤ x <0.45 0.25≤ x < 0.35 x < 0.25 
Qual. of service 
delivery index 
0.9≤ x 0.75≤ x < 0.9 0.6≤ x <0.75 0.45≤ x < 0.6 x < 0.45 
Qual. of roads 
index 














1.95 <x 1.8 <x≤ 1.95 1.65 <x≤ 1.8 1.5 <x≤ 1.65 1<x≤1.5 
Developer’s 
experience(years) 
10 ≤ x 6 < x ≤ 9 4 < x ≤ 6 2< x ≤ 4 2 ≤ x 
 
It was decided to leave Altman Z”-Score variable with four intervals as internally defined in 
the research paper that promulgated it. The intervals as originally classified are specific and 




4.2.3 Interpolation of Basel II “PD Calibration” formula 




 . The result for a and b between the parameters 0.0042min 
and 0.2380max  are:  a= 3.316069; and b= 0.2152393 
 
Weighting of the variables for analysing property risk and cash flow risks found to positively 
influence the Spearman’s rho when set at these levels: 
 
The prototype formula is expressed in the form: 
(𝑃𝐷𝑅) = 𝑓𝑖  (β𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑖 + β𝑩𝑋𝐵𝑖 + β𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑖) 
Where: 










XCi = 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘): 𝑓(𝑃) = 1 − 𝑍"𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
 
4.2.4 Calibration of property risk factor’s variables XAi 
score= ⅕ LTV score; (-10;10) + ⅕ Quality of Roads score; (-10;10) +⅕ Quality of Service 
Delivery; (-10;10) +⅕ Bid-rent score; (-10;10) +⅕ Condition of improvements score; 
(-10;10) 
 
4.2.5 Calibration of cash flow risk factor’s variables XBi 
score= ⅔ developer’s experience score; (-10;10) + ⅓ ICR score; (-10;10)  
 
4.2.6 Calibration of Borrower Risk factor’s variable XCi 
No changes were made on the weighting of Altman’s Z”-Scores variables. They formula is 
taken as-is. 
Z” =  6.56 (
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) + 3.26 (
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
) + 6.72 (
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠







4.2.7 Final calibration of PDR 
The following weightings were discovered to provide the acceptable level of correlation, 
where Spearman’s rho was measured to be ρ= 0.5515. 
 (𝑃𝐷𝑅) = 𝑓𝑖(0.3𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑖 +  0.4𝐵𝑋𝐵𝑖 + 0.3𝐶𝑋𝐶𝑖) 
After experimentation was conducted with respect to the weighting of the risk factors; it was 
discovered that the weighting proposed in the above formula was optimal in achieving the 
highest possible Spearman Correlation at 0.5394. Although this proposed weighting is not 
evenly spread among the factors, its greater reliance on the “cash flow risk” factor, being XBi, 
is acceptable as the highest reliance in any specialised lending (or investment financing) 
should be the target asset’s ability to repay the loan. In a property finance and project finance 
environment this ability to repay the loan would be reflected by the net cash proceeds 
generated from the asset  
The other factors, with weightings of 0.33 each, are critical in establishing the anticipated 
correlation to the aggregated expert panel rankings with the “property risk” factor’s input. 
In securing that correlation being the answer to research question number 2 and achieving 
research objective number 2. 
 
4.3 Evaluating the Pilot  
The contents of the research methodology were synthesized into a functional MS Excel® 
spreadsheet for calculating the default probability and therefore the counter-party credit 
risk of any real world affordable housing finance proposal. A sample of 10 simulated 
transactions was generated to assess the validity of the model insofar as its ability to rate 
credit risk similarly to industry experts. The results are provided below. 
4.3.1 Findings 
This section reports findings on the experimental research as well hypothetical worse-case 
and best-case scenarios.  The latter two scenarios are intended to attest to the accuracy and 
give context to the PDRs’ from experimental research. Table 15 below shows findings from 
the experimental research. The results indicate the PDRs as calculated by the model.  
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Experimentation was done with the factor and variable weightings to give acceptable 
correlation with the known expert rankings. The findings indicate how the final PDR is 
calculated with the scoring of each variable seen on each simulated transaction (Annexure 
F) 
 
The PDR is equated to the Moody’s rating notch associated with the Basel II PD. It is done 
this way to bring a level of understanding with regards to the inherent credit risk associated 
with the financing of such deal. Without further studies conducted (as suggested in the text 
below) it is meant to give rise to deal pricing negotiations- where interest rates and initiation 
fees can be set, this would be done by comparative negotiations where transactions with the 
same credit risk rating would be used as the basis or benchmark for pricing new deals. 
International financiers or those domestic ones who attract international funds would find 
this useful as be credit risk would be directly translated to a “language” they are au fait with. 
 
The validation of the risk ratings, or PDR, comes by way of the Spearman correlation with 
the expert panel results. Validation of whether the model can perform in such a way that the 
means of the two newly correlated data sets is done by the Kruskal-Wallis H-test- if there is 
no statistically significant difference in the means then the model is seen as one that 
performs, at a given alpha (α), the same way as an aggregated expert panel would and is 




Table 16- Risk rating outcomes per functional scoring model 
 
Simulated sample tranaction name Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 3 Deal 4 Deal 5 Deal 6 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 9 Deal 10
Total development cost 64 740 000R           64 140 000R           66 000 000R           66 270 000R           65 310 000R           61 534 000R           65 025 000R           65 595 000R           66 675 000R           66 180 000R           
Borrowers equity (28% of cost) 18 127 200R           16 035 000R           16 500 000R           23 194 500R           14 368 200R           18 460 200R           16 256 250R           14 430 900R           16 668 750R           13 236 000R           
Secured senior loan 46 612 800R           48 105 000R           49 500 000R           43 075 500R           50 941 800R           43 073 800R           48 768 750R           51 164 100R           50 006 250R           52 944 000R           
Net income yield 6,7% 6,2% 7,4% 7,2% 6,2% 6,8% 7,5% 7,2% 6,5% 8,5%
Capitalisation rate 11% 11,25% 10,50% 10,75% 11,25% 10,75% 10,25% 10,50% 10,50% 9,75%
LTV with property cap rate of 61,2% 64,8% 61,7% 55,0% 68,7% 55,2% 58,9% 63,6% 61,9% 60,8%
Interest cover ratio 1,78 1,69 1,66 1,91 1,56 1,90 1,70 1,57 1,66 1,56
Developer's direct experience 8years 4years 12years 5years 2years 8years 8years 5years 3years 11years
Firm's L-T assets 90 250 000R           57 050 000R           98 770 000R           138 910 000R         54 110 000R           84 730 000R           97 600 000R           77 050 000R           60 030 000R           100 630 000R         
Firm's S-T assets 8 150 000R              5 590 000R              10 070 000R           19 940 000R           8 340 000R              11 720 000R           10 850 000R           11 400 000R           6 580 000R              26 120 000R           
Total assets 98 400 000R           62 640 000R           108 840 000R         158 850 000R         62 450 000R           96 450 000R           108 450 000R         88 450 000R           66 610 000R           126 750 000R         
Firm's L-T liabilities 52 800 000R           31 680 000R           69 400 000R           107 400 000R         36 400 000R           65 000 000R           55 450 000R           65 000 000R           35 000 000R           63 400 000R           
Firm's S-T liabilities 3 830 000R              1 398 000R              5 160 000R              10 050 000R           3 035 000R              7 535 000R              5 535 000R              7 535 000R              3 335 000R              7 535 000R              
Total liabilities 56 630 000R           33 078 000R           74 560 000R           117 450 000R         39 435 000R           72 535 000R           60 985 000R           72 535 000R           38 335 000R           70 935 000R           
Equity (retained inome + issued capital) 41 770 000R           29 562 000R           34 280 000R           41 400 000R           23 015 000R           23 915 000R           47 465 000R           15 915 000R           28 275 000R           55 815 000R           
Firm's Annual Revenue 12 350 000R           7 410 000R              17 850 000R           19 350 000R           6 990 000R              7 590 000R              7 590 000R              7 590 000R              6 590 000R              19 590 000R           
Firm's EBIT 4 640 000R              2 784 000R              7 760 000R              9 890 000R              1 890 000R              7 060 000R              7 060 000R              7 060 000R              2 760 000R              10 060 000R           
Variable 1 (LTV) (rounded to next whole number) 2 2 2 4 1 4 3 2 2 2
Value of score -5 -5 -5 5 -10 5 0 -5 -5 -5
Variable 2 ( Quality of Roads) 3 3 3 3 5 4 2 3 4 3
Value of score 0 0 0 0 10 5 -5 0 5 0
metric 3 ( Quality of Service delivery) 3 3 3 3 5 3 2 3 4 3
Value of score 0 0 0 0 10 0 -5 0 5 0
Variable 4 (Bid-rent value) 3 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 4
Value of score 0 5 5 5 10 5 0 5 0 5
Variable 6 (Qual. of improvements to land) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Value of score 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Aggregate property risk score 0,00 1,00 1,00 3,00 5,00 4,00 -1,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
βᴀ Xᴀᵢ  (where βᴀ=0,2) 17,30% 16,72% 16,72% 15,62% 14,58% 15,09% 17,89% 16,72% 16,16% 16,72%
ICR score 4 3 3 5 3 5 4 2 3 2
Developer Experience Score 4 3 5 3 2 4 4 3 3 5
4,00 3,00 4,33 3,67 2,33 4,33 4,00 2,67 3,00 4,00
βᴃ Xᴃᵢ  (where βᴃ=0,65) 15,09% 15,62% 14,92% 15,26% 15,98% 14,92% 15,09% 15,80% 15,62% 15,09%
Altman's Z"-Score (z one-tail) 2,11 2,31 1,82 1,85 1,83 1,85 2,51 1,72 2,16 3,04
Default probablity 0,98 0,99 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,99 0,96 0,98 0,999
Propability of default (1- P-Value) = 
βᴄ Xᴄᵢ  (where βᴄ=0,15) 1,74% 1,04% 3,44% 3,22% 3,36% 3,22% 0,60% 4,27% 1,54% 0,12%
PDR 0,1353 0,1365 0,1356 0,1353 0,1381 0,1320 0,1348 0,1425 0,1362 0,1317
Model rank 4 8 6 5 9 2 3 10 7 1
Ordinal consensus rank (from expert panel) 6 7 1 8 10 2 4 5 9 3



















   
   
   
   
   
   











































Below are results from the two hypothetical scenario, that is, the worse-case and the best-case scenario, respectively. The worse-
case scenario is where (i) the property in question as the worst scoring and (ii) cash flow risk is maximum, and (iii) Z”-score for 
borrower risks is the least favourable. In contrast, the best-case scenario is where (i) the property in question as the best scoring 
and (ii) cash flow risk is minimum, and (iii) Z”-score for borrower risks is the most favourable. 
 
Worst-case scenario  
Table 16 indicates the highest and therefore riskiest possible outcome, the PDR of 32.54% is above the upper-bound limit of 
Moody’s credit rating of C of 23.8%. This is mathematically possible, yet practically improbable as Z-score of 0.01 would 
represent a default probability of 49.6%, this represents the lowest possible P-value on the normal standard distribution table. 
Table 17- Theoretical maximum risk rating calculation 
 
Simulated sample tranaction name Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 3 Deal 4 Deal 5 Deal 6 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 9 Deal 10
Variable 1 (LTV) (rounded to next whole number) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Value of score -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Variable 2 ( Quality of Roads) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Value of score -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
metric 3 ( Quality of Service delivery) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Value of score -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Variable 4 (Bid-rent value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Value of score -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Variable 6 (Qual. of improvements to land) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Value of score -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Aggregate property risk score -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00
βᴀ Xᴀᵢ  (where βᴀ=0,3) 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800%
ICR score 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
-10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Developer Experience Score 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
-10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
-10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00 -10,00
βᴃ Xᴃᵢ  (where βᴃ=0,4) 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800% 23,800%
Altman's Z"-Score (z one-tail) 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Default probablity 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504 0,504
Propability of default (1- P-Value) = 
βᴄ Xᴄᵢ  (where βᴄ=0,3) 49,600% 49,600% 49,600% 49,600% 49,600% 49,600% 49,600% 49,600% 49,600% 49,600%
Moody's rating comensurate with PDR C C C C C C C C C C
PDR 31,540% 31,540% 31,540% 31,540% 31,540% 31,540% 31,540% 31,540% 31,540% 31,540%
Model rank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ordinal consensus rank (from expert panel) 3 6 10 7 8 1 2 4 9 5
Sprearman's correlation (rho=ρ) #DIV/0!
   
   
   
   
   
   






























Table 17 indicates the lowest and therefore least risky outcome, the PDR of 0.324% is below the lower-bound limit of Moody’s 
credit rating of Baa2 (the sovereign rating of South Africa)- which is 0.42%. This is made possible by the mathematically possible, 
yet practically improbable, default probability of 0.1%- this represents the highest possible Z-value on the normal standard 
distribution table of 3.09.  
Table 18- Theoretical minimum risk rating calculation 
 
 
Simulated sample tranaction name Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 3 Deal 4 Deal 5 Deal 6 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 9 Deal 10
Variable 1 (LTV) (rounded to next whole number) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Value of score 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Variable 2 ( Quality of Roads) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Value of score 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
metric 3 ( Quality of Service delivery) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Value of score 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Variable 4 (Bid-rent value) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Value of score 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Variable 6 (Qual. of improvements to land) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Value of score 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Aggregate property risk score 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00
βᴀ Xᴀᵢ  (where βᴀ=0,3) 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420%
ICR score 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Developer Experience Score 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00
βᴃ Xᴃᵢ  (where βᴃ=0,4) 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420% 0,420%
Altman's Z"-Score (z one-tail) 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,09
Default probablity 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999
Propability of default (1- P-Value) = 
βᴄ Xᴄᵢ  (where βᴄ=0,3) 0,100% 0,100% 0,100% 0,100% 0,100% 0,100% 0,100% 0,100% 0,100% 0,100%
Moody's rating comensurate with PDR Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2 Baa2
PDR 0,324% 0,324% 0,324% 0,324% 0,324% 0,324% 0,324% 0,324% 0,324% 0,324%
Model rank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ordinal consensus rank (from expert panel) 3 6 10 7 8 1 2 4 9 5
Sprearman's correlation (rho=ρ) #DIV/0!
   
   
   
   
   
   





























Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA on ranks (see Annexure H) 
 
Below is statistical analysis of the difference, or variance, between and among the two sets 
of correlated data in Table 16, namely the Ordinal consensus rank (as the independent 
variable) and the rankings generated by the model itself (as the dependent variable). The 
table below (inclusive of MS Excel® break-down of methodology) was generated using an 
advanced data analysis “Tool/Resource Pack” which is used as an Add-in for MS Excel®. 
    Table 19: Kruskal-Wallis H-test 
 
 
The test revels that there is no statistical significance at, α=0.05, between the two medians, 
being the two sets of ranked data and therefore no statistically significant evidence is found 
to disproved the efficacy of the model to mimic an agreeable panel of credit experts. A 
hypothesis of whether the difference in variability among the two medians/means39, given 
the above conditions, would be rejected as variability is statistically insignificant. 
 
4.3.2 Key Outcomes 
The results indicated the interplay of risks identified in the market as key drivers of credit 
risk. The simulated sample transactions indicate the varying levels of risk among the 
variables regarded by industry experts as being vital to the health of a residential property 
transaction. These being (i) the strength of the cash flows in a proposed developer and (ii) 
the experience the developer has in building and operating similar investments speaks to 
their ability to ensure that the projected cash flow materializes.  
                                                   
39 Had the distributions from the two data sets been shaped the same then it would have been the statistical 
significance of two means rather than two medians - the assumption is that had the correlation been much 
higher than the observed ρ=0,5515 seen in Table 16, then the variability would have been far more similar and 










In the time spent by the researcher40 in financing property developments this cash flow risk 
has been noted as the cornerstone of adjudication of funding proposals in my experience is 
that adjudication of funding proposals (thus borrower/developer risk) is regarded as the 
one risk that is most difficult to guard against or prepare for. The thoughts among venerable 
financiers is that they also don’t have sufficient or entrenched networks in terms of building 
professionals and (sub)contractors to negotiate competitive rates. Furthermore- 
inexperienced developers not only have immature operational infrastructure to manage 
investments, they also lack appropriate collateral as they are still building up their asset 
bases. This risk has been keenly observed and placed as a high priority even among the 
expert panel interviewed for this experimental research. 
 
The risks considered manageable are the risks associated with the financial standing of the 
obligor and the risks associated with the specification of the proposed residential property 
development- they are manageable insofar as financiers can, on:  
a) Property risk- curtail their exposure to such risks be structuring deal in a particular way 
such as limiting how much they wish to loan against the envisaged value of the 
development, a type of development (high-rise or low-rise) or the area development is 
located in (sometimes referred to as geographical concentration risk); and  
b) Obligor/borrower risk- decide that a deal be housed in a separate or ring-fenced juristic 
entity to as to protect it from being collateralised or exposed to other creditors. These 
risks are regarded as ancillary but are still highly regarded. 
 
4.4 Summary 
The model was built along reasonable and market-related risk drivers. The strength of the 
model using the worst- and best-case scenarios and the concept’s evaluation would have 
been stronger had a wider panel been selected. This wider range panelists would have 
allowed a more robust interrogation of the correlation that serves to support or fail to 
                                                   
40  The researcher was a banker in large commercial bank. The bank had the greatest market share in 
investment real estate finance and the first to create a specialised unit for affordable housing finance. The 
researcher served in various roles in the deal origination and client management business unit of the bank 
including one year as a Relationship and Project Oversight Manager for their affordable housing finance unit.  
84 
 
support the hypothesis. This, however, would have served to go beyond proving 
functionality and rather to scrutinize the performance of the model. This is beyond the scope 
of a POC and of this research. 
 
The POC has systematically proceeded to prove functionality of the proposed undertaking 
by beginning to introduce the undertaking, establishing the success criteria, conducting the 
pilot and lastly evaluating its efficacy in relation to the success criteria. The impact 
investment credit risk assessment model has, in the view of the researcher:  
a. Has met the user’s needs 
b. Has performed as publicized 
c. Has allowed a prospective end user(s) to enjoy enhanced productivity, insofar as 
assessing the credit risk of high-density affordable housing finance. 
d. Has ultimately proved to be a functional and feasible solution. 
 
The model is ready to be empirically tested.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the study, recommendations of areas for further 
study as well as possible avenues for further development of the PoC aimed at improving its 
(best-in-class project screening credit risk management model’s) functionality and 
performance. It achieves the above by summarizing research’s findings related to the 5 
research questions as well as suggestions on how to further develop the POC towards 
implementing a full pilot project and realising it as a functional credit risk assessment tool. 
 
5.2 Research conclusions 
The living standards and lifestyles of the working class in developing countries brings sharp 
attention to the ideological and practical debates around what exactly is considered a living 
wage; whether it’s  
a) meant to create and sustain decent urban communities where workers and their 
dependents have great access to social and physical amenities, like good healthcare and 
education, and promote the reasonable expectation of generational economic mobility. A 
living wage premised on the fact that employers recognise and internalize that the 
working class is tremendously burdened by a predatory retail credit market, both formal 
and informal credit and that a seemingly marginal erosion in purchasing power and 
disposable income can easily become a catastrophe to even a dual-income family.  
b) or is a living wage merely one that ensures survival and the opportunity to afford the bare 
essentials of an urban life, one that, by extension, concretizes a hand-to-mouth status quo 
among the working class. Does this living wage then keep up with nominal inflation or 
exceed it? What beyond food, basic shelter and public transport, personal consumables 
and a below-par education for children does it provide? 
 
Where and how people live, especially the working and lower-middle class has been proven 
over the past decades to be an apex determinant of generational economic mobility. 
Although South Africa has had a watershed, insofar as the end of statutory subjugation of the 
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Black, Coloured and Indian population, the proverbial dust settles on our contemporary 
economic dispensation, the patterns observed worldwide with respect to generational 
economic mobility will fully penetrate our society and crystalize. Quality affordable housing, 
where quality is not merely determined by the housing scheme alone, but by a holistic 
analysis of the immediate surroundings that the housing scheme will be erecting is beneficial 
to the evolution of urban agglomeration in a new South Africa. It would also be highly 
beneficial to the analysis of credit risk when financing such developments. This would signal 
a fundamental altering of the spatial distribution of income and racial demographics, if 
successful. This and similar interventions would be, to post-apartheid South Africa, what 
Greenpeace was to whaling and ocean conservation.  
 
The literature offers sound measures for sustaining rapid and inclusive urbanisation and 
outlines the benefits of accommodating and aligning the working class to the urban 
mainstream by building quality housing schemes that they can afford. The said housing 
schemes should have well-maintained amenities and. If this happens, it would imply another 
watershed in inclusive social cohesion and rainbow nation building. The literature also 
supports and demonstrates the depth of socially responsible investment in developing 
counties and the availability of funds globally to fight the ills that plague communities 
regarded as the base of the pyramid. 
 
Having conducted a thorough analysis, the research has been able to lay the foundations for 
such a far-reaching intervention. The assumption that a random utility maximizing 
consumer has a stronger inclination to live in better located and better functioning 
neighbourhoods and whether that translates to either a higher propensity to pay 
accommodation costs on time or a higher level of determination to seek such 
accommodation41  has shown itself in the market. The level of correlation among the panel 
of credit experts has indicated a consensus about risk-drivers in financing these affordable 
residential developments. 
                                                   
41 Thereby profoundly driving up demand for well-located housing in what is an already 
burgeoning segment of the market. 
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The deepening of financial markets is the catalyst in the growth of the mortgage sector. Such 
mortgage growth must be absorbed, in a significant way, by the working class and lower-
middle income in a way that betters their circumstances and promotes economic mobility 
for themselves and their dependents. South Africa, especially the economic engine that is 
Gauteng, was intentionally crafted and engineered to ensure indenture and containment of 
the working class and the poor in order to ensure that minority capital could flourish 
unabated. Undeniably, it cannot be left to happenstance to undo such engineering. The 
literature asserts the potential to augment future spatial and income distribution by 
changing the environments children and young adults are reared so it stands to reason that 
attracting impact investment capital to build integrated communities can break cycles of 
poverty and economic indebtedness.  
 
The credit risk modeling tool developed by the research has been found to be an adequate 
foundation to attract such impact investment capital as it can translate locally understood 
and verifiable credit risks into a globally acclaimed financial risk metrics. 
 
With a Spearman’s rho of 0.5515, the null hypothesis is rejected. This means that the results 
support research’s hypothesis of evident consensus between the experts and the data to 
sufficiently infer consensus. To this end, the proof of concept is successfully concluded. 
 
5.3 Avenues for further study 
▪ The research’s resultant model could be further developed with through-the-cycle data 
towards the pilot stage, where equations can be operationalized and tested in the field 
against the credit risk assessment of credit/investment-management committees. 
 
▪ Bayesian average ranking: As the next step, when parametric data begins to emerge, a 
sampling distribution can be derived and variance developed. A posterior mean and 
standard error once derived. This would be best achieved through a Monte Carlo simulation.  
▪ Fuzzy Logic: Adapted for credit risk assessment, Shang & Hossen (2013) explain that 
adaptation to be traditional economic or financial risk models are based on probability and 
classical sets. This is where elements are either included in the set or are not (true or false 
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and/or right or wrong). Using these sets is widely acceptable in assessing market, credit, 
insurance and trading risk. In contrast, fuzzy logic models are built upon fuzzy sets, where 
“an element is included with a degree of truth normally ranging from 0 to 1. They are useful 
for analyzing risks with insufficient knowledge or nebulous data. Fuzzy set theory allows 
for an object to be categorized in more than one exclusive set with different levels of truth 
or confidence as it “explicitly considers the cause-and-effect chain among variables” (p.3). 
 
▪ Logit regression model: A full scale logistic or probit model could be derived in future and 
would need curated credit-risk monitoring data detailing performance of internally 
approved loans or externally funded (by peers) affordable rental housing development. 
The validation of the efficacy of such a model could be calculated with a Brier Score. 
 
▪ Multivariate loan interest rate (pricing) model: As loan and borrower data becomes curated, 
a population will emerge that will form the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation, whereby one 
can establish a median interest rate across the portfolio of loans. This median lending rate 
for successfully approved transactions and the total aggregated credit risk (the total PDR) 
can become the baseline for deal pricing, where any deal with lower overall credit risk can 
be priced below the median rate and any deal with a higher level of overall credit risk can 
be priced at a higher interest rate. The extent of movement from the median interest rate 
can be done by means of interpolation. Basel IRB methodology could also be used for 
settling interest rates for transactions provided credible data for calculating or assigning 
Loss Given Default 42  (“LGD”) and monitoring of Migration Risk, where senior debt 
transactions are approved on the basis that their risk-reward payoffs were acceptable, but 
unfavourable market or endogenous conditions have materially changed the risk profiles 
of such approved and on-the-books transactions.  
 
  
                                                   
42 The loss-given-default rate for a security is 100% minus the value that is received at default resolution (which 
may occur at a single point in time or accrue over an interval of time), discounted by the coupon rate back to 
the date the last debt service payment was made, divided by the principal outstanding at the date of the last 
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Each expert is in a credit risk management role at a South African commercial bank that 
have extensive exposure to affordable housing development finance. The initials of the 
respondent as are given below as their names (to identify them), along with a brief outline 
of their credit risk experience and job title. 
   
Name 
(initials) 
Qualification Job title and credit risk experience 
I.K B.Comm (Hons) UJ; 
M.Sc. (Building) *candidate Wits 
University  
Regional Credit Head: Affordable 
Housing Developments (Nedbank). 
11 years’ credit risk experience 
S.K B.Comm UKZN (formerly Univ. of 
Natal); 
B.Sc (Hons) Wits University 
Regional Credit Head: Residential 
Developments (Nedbank). 14 years’ 
credit risk experience. 
M.D B.Comm (Economics) UJ; 
B.Comm (Hons) UNISA 
Credit Risk Manager: Corporate Real 
Estate (Standard Bank). 6 years’ 
credit risk experience 
Z.P B.Sc (Hons) Wits University; 
M.M (Finance & Investments) Wits 
Business School 
Credit Risk Manager: Commercial 
and Residential Real Estate (Standard 
Bank). 3 years’ credit risk experience. 
L.G B.Sc (Hons) Wits University; 
M.Sc. (Building) *candidate Wits 
University 
Credit Manager: Commercial and 
Residential Property (FNB). 2 years’ 
credit risk experience 
D.C Higher Credit Diploma, Credit Risk 
Management; 
Certified Associate of the Institute 
of Bankers (CAIB) 
Credit Manager: Real Estate. 15 
years’ credit risk experience 
 
** ABSA/Barclays Africa and Investec Bank were not consulted as their respective affordable 
housing development finance unit had been operational for only 6 months and had no specialised 











Rankings are expressed as an ordered listing of object labels organised in a hierarchy 
from highest to lowest. To rank data in an ordinal manner a system of linear ordering 
(ranking) must be undertaken over a set of objects whereby all the objects are ranked 
and no ties are allowed. If the above restriction of not allowing ties is relaxed to allow 
unlimited ties, then the result is a weak ordering. Mathematical tools are pivotal of such 
an undertaking is sought for practical applications. There are some that while useful for 
a rating or scoring make them un-useful for rankings- two such method is Kendall’s Tau 
(τb) and the Borda Count method(Emond & Mason 2002). 
 
The Consensus Ordinal Ranking method is a technique allowing for no ties in ranking x 
number of observations by n number judges/panelists. It does this by a tally-count of 
highest rankings achieved rankings for observation x and then in the case of a ties it then 
tallies the number of the next-best ranking. It first counts the observation with the highest 
number of number 1 rankings and if there is a tie it will tally how many of those same 
observations got a ranking of number 2 and so forth until an untied consensus rank is 
achieved. It is the same method employed in the Olympic Games for medals tally and 
subsequent country ranking.   
 
Below the consensus ordinal ranking method was used to rank the 10 observations 
(simulated sample transactions) ranked by a panel of 6 credit risk industry experts. 
 
 
It’s evident in the above that deals 3, 6 and 10 had two panelists each assigning them with 
a number 1 ranking, deal 3 however was ranked number 2 by three panelists while 6 and 
7 only achieved one ranking of number 2, each. This process goes on until a ranking is 
produced based on where the consensus within the group of panelists lay in ranking their 
preferences, this method was chosen for its ability to counter-act the influence of one 
“wayward” judge or panelist with a wildly differing opinion from the rest of the group. 
  
Rank Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 3 Deal 4 Deal 5 Deal 6 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 9 Deal 10
1st II II II
2nd III I I I
3rd II III I
4th II I I I I
5th II I I II
6th II I I I I
7th I II I II
8th I II III
9th I II III
10th I IIIII
Consensus 
rank 6 7 1 8 10 2 4 5 9 3
Re-organized in ascending order of preference
Sample 
transaction
Deal 3 Deal 6 Deal 10 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 4 Deal 9 Deal 5
Consensus 
rank




















Quality of Life 2013 Survey description 
 
In order to measure quality of life, the GCRO Quality of Life surveys include over 200 
indicator questions across a wide range of areas; 54 of those are variables used to 
construct the quality of life index. These include subjective and objective indicator 
questions.  
All are combined into 10 ‘dimensions’ of quality of life – to try and measure both overall 
quality of life, and the ‘drivers’ behind it either rising or falling. These dimensions include 
work, socio-political, global, security, connectivity, community, family, dwelling, health 
and infrastructure. Each indicator is allocated a score of 0 or 1 for each individual 
respondent. These are combined to create each of the ten dimensions, which are scaled 
out of 1, where the maximum possible score for each dimension is 1. A score of 1 reflects 
extremely high levels of quality of life, a score of 0 the reverse. When the dimensions are 
added, perfect quality of life is represented by 10 (out of 10), thus the higher the score 
the higher the level of quality of life. For more detail regarding the construction of the 
quality of life index please refer to 
http://www.gcro.ac.za/gcr/review/2013/gcro/qol/quality-of-life. 
 
The ward level results indicate the areas of lowest quality of life are concentrated in the 
former townships such as Alexandra, Tembisa, Sebokeng and Mamelodi. These findings 
confirm the resilience of apartheid inequalities, and the way they are woven into the 
spatial geography of the city-region. For more information on the 2013 quality of life 









Sample Property Specification. 11 124 000R    278 100R              8 343 000R         9,8% 85569231
11 232 000R    280 800R              8 424 000R         9,8% 86400000 Assumptions
Total Number of units: 150 size Initial rental Std dev Annual Income 87500000 57,4 1.Developer is main contractor
(spacious) 1 bed, 1 bath 50 49sqm 5 000R                   R (0) 3 000 000R         2.All Professionals have equal experience, sufficient PI Cover &
2bed, 1 bath 70 58sqm 6 500R                   R (0) 5 460 000R         64,85876 3. Building period is 12 months
 (family unit- ground floor) 2bed, 2 bath 30 65sqm 7 400R                   300R   2 664 000R         approx. 4. No phasing of construction but 50 units handed over to tenants from month 11
30% 5230,769 5. Interim payments for work done and certified to be paid on 'balance to complete ' balance
6. Long term loan assumed to be 10 years with no residual at end of term
Building Cost (excl. P&G and Land Cost)incl. VAT 54 000 000R         7. The Developer's (Firm/Group) Long term assets are investment property
8. Retained earnings are half of equity
Location: Suider Street, Wonderboom cost per opportunity Location: Acacia Street, Proclamation Hill (Pta West) cost per opportunity
Land Cost: R 7 500 000R       50000 https://www.google.co.za/maps/place/Wolmer,+Pretoria,+0182/@-25.6844075,28.1771966,987m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x1ebfd977de9395b5:0xec1edb5a46eca2a4Land Cost: R 6 900 000R         46000 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-25.7515475,28.1415839,615m/data=!3m1!1e3
Building Cost 54 000 000R     Building Cost 54 000 000R      
P&G (6%) 3 240 000R       P&G (7%) 3 240 000R         
Total development cost 64 740 000R     Total development cost 64 140 000R      
Borrowers equity (28% of cost) 18 127 200R     Borrowers equity (25%) 16 035 000R      
Secured senior loan (72% LTC) 46 612 800R     Secured senior loan (75% LTV) 48 105 000R      
Net income yield 6,7% Net income yield 6,2%
Interest cover ratio 1,78 Interest cover ratio 1,69
LTV with property cap rate of 11,% 61,2% LTV with property cap rate of 11,25% 64,8%
Developer's direct experience 8years Developer's direct experience 4years 0,6
Firm's L-T assets 90 250 000R     Firm's L-T assets 57 050 000R      0,7
Firm's S-T assets 3 250 000R       Firm's S-T assets 2 650 000R         
Firm's L-T liabilities 52 800 000R     Firm's L-T liabilities 31 680 000R      
Firm's S-T liabilities 3 830 000R       Firm's S-T liabilities 1 398 000R         
Firm's Annual Revenue 12 350 000R     Firm's Annual Revenue 7 410 000R         
Working Capital 4 900 000R       Working Capital 2 940 000R         
Firm's EBIT 4 640 000R       Firm's EBIT 2 784 000R         
Location: End Street, Clubview (Centurion)cost per opportunity Location: Beech Ave, Woodmere (Germiston) cost per opportunity
Land Cost: R 9 300 000R       62000 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-25.8436993,28.1784603,1194m/data=!3m1!1e3 Land Cost: R 7 950 000R         53000 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-26.1820043,28.1879517,1111m/data=!3m1!1e3
Building Cost 54 000 000R     Building Cost 54 000 000R      
P&G (5%) 2 700 000R       P&G (8%) 4 320 000R         
Total development cost 66 000 000R     Total development cost 66 270 000R      
7,1%
Borrowers equity (25%) 16 500 000R     Borrowers equity (35%) 23 194 500R      
Secured senior loan (75% LTC) 49 500 000R     Secured senior loan (65% LTC) 43 075 500R      
Net income yield 7,4% Net income yield 7,2%
Interest cover ratio 1,66 Interest cover ratio 1,91
LTV with property cap rate of 10,5% 61,7% LTV with property cap rate of 10,75% 55,0%
Developer's direct experience 12years Developer's direct experience 5years
Firm's L-T assets 98 770 000R     Firm's L-T assets 138 910 000R    
Firm's S-T assets 4 280 000R       Firm's S-T assets 4 590 000R         
Firm's L-T liabilities 69 400 000R     Firm's L-T liabilities 107 400 000R    
Firm's S-T liabilities 5 160 000R       Firm's S-T liabilities 10 050 000R      
Firm's Annual Revenue 17 850 000R     Firm's Annual Revenue 19 350 000R      
Working Capital 5 790 000R       Working Capital 15 350 000R      
Firm's EBIT 7 760 000R       Firm's EBIT 9 890 000R         
Deal 1 Deal 2
Deal 3 Deal 4
 Total Expense Ratio (incl. all overhead, maintenance & management cost)
Impression of Completed Project
II 
 
Location: Nedeberg Ave, Sonneveld (Brakpan) cost per opportunity Location: Monument Road, Glen Erasmia (Kempton Park) cost per opportunity
Land Cost: R 6 450 000R       43000 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-26.2618519,28.3387643,1647m/data=!3m1!1e3 Land Cost: R 7 425 000R         49500 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-26.0730169,28.2632017,1016m/data=!3m1!1e3
Building Cost 54 000 000R     Building Cost 54 000 000R      
P&G (9%) 4 860 000R       P&G (7%) 109 000R            
Total development cost 65 310 000R     Total development cost 61 534 000R      
Borrowers equity (22%) 14 368 200R     Borrowers equity (30%) 18 460 200R      
Secured senior loan (75% LTC) 50 941 800R     Secured senior loan (70% LTC) 43 073 800R      
Net income yield 6,2% Net income yield 6,8%
Interest cover ratio 1,56 Interest cover ratio 1,90
LTV with property cap rate of 11,25% 68,7% LTV with property cap rate of 10,75% 55%
Developer's direct experience 2years Developer's direct experience 8years
Firm's L-T assets 54 110 000R     Firm's L-T assets 84 730 000R      
Firm's S-T assets 4 390 000R       Firm's S-T assets 2 770 000R         
Firm's L-T liabilities 36 400 000R     Firm's L-T liabilities 65 000 000R      
Firm's S-T liabilities 3 035 000R       Firm's S-T liabilities 7 535 000R         
Firm's Annual Revenue 6 990 000R       Firm's Annual Revenue 7 590 000R         
Working Capital 3 950 000R       Working Capital 8 950 000R         
Firm's EBIT 1 890 000R       Firm's EBIT 7 060 000R         
Location: Bellairs Drive, Northriding cost per opportunity Location: Hendrina Street, Ridgeway (Jhb South) cost per opportunity
Land Cost: R 8 325 000R       55500 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-26.0518038,27.963857,967m/data=!3m1!1e3 Land Cost: R 7 275 000R         48500 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-26.0518038,27.963857,967m/data=!3m1!1e3
Building Cost 54 000 000R     Building Cost 54 000 000R      
P&G (5%) 2 700 000R       P&G (8%) 4 320 000R         
Total development cost 65 025 000R     Total development cost 65 595 000R      
Borrowers equity (25%) 16 256 250R     Borrowers equity (22%) 14 430 900R      
Secured senior loan (75% LTC) 48 768 750R     Secured senior loan (78% LTC) 51 164 100R      
Net income yield 7,5% Net income yield 7,2%
Interest cover ratio 1,70 Interest cover ratio 1,57
LTV with property cap rate of 10,25% 58,9% LTV with property cap rate of 10,5% 63,6%
Developer's direct experience 8years Developer's direct experience 5years
Firm's L-T assets 97 600 000R     Firm's L-T assets 77 050 000R      
Firm's S-T assets 1 900 000R       Firm's S-T assets 2 450 000R         
Firm's L-T liabilities 55 450 000R     Firm's L-T liabilities 65 000 000R      
Firm's S-T liabilities 5 535 000R       Firm's S-T liabilities 7 535 000R         
Firm's Annual Revenue 7 590 000R       Firm's Annual Revenue 7 590 000R         
Working Capital 8 950 000R       Working Capital 8 950 000R         
Firm's EBIT 7 060 000R       Firm's EBIT 7 060 000R         
Location: Lawrence Street, Honeydew (Roodepoort) cost per opportunity Location: Grand Central Blvd., Halfway House (Midrand) cost per opportunity
Land Cost: R 7 275 000R       48500 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-26.0944563,27.8606422,3447a,20y,180h/data=!3m1!1e3Land Cost: R 8 400 000R         56000 https://www.google.co.za/maps/@-25.9955017,28.1306153,1217m/data=!3m1!1e3
Building Cost 54 000 000R     Building Cost 54 000 000R      
P&G (10%) 5 400 000R       P&G (7%) 3 780 000R         
Total development cost 66 675 000R     Total development cost 66 180 000R      
Borrowers equity (25%) 16 668 750R     Borrowers equity (20%) 13 236 000R      
Secured senior loan (75% LTC) 50 006 250R     Secured senior loan (80% LTC) 52 944 000R      
Net income yield 6,5% Net income yield 8,5%
Interest cover ratio 1,66 Interest cover ratio 1,56
LTV with property cap rate of 10,5% 61,9% LTV with property cap rate of 9,75% 60,79%
Developer's direct experience 3years Developer's direct experience 11years
Firm's L-T assets 60 030 000R     Firm's L-T assets 100 630 000R    
Firm's S-T assets 2 330 000R       Firm's S-T assets 6 170 000R         
Firm's L-T liabilities 35 000 000R     Firm's L-T liabilities 63 400 000R      
Firm's S-T liabilities 3 335 000R       Firm's S-T liabilities 7 535 000R         
Firm's Annual Revenue 6 590 000R       Firm's Annual Revenue 19 590 000R      
Working Capital 4 250 000R       Working Capital 19 950 000R      
Firm's EBIT 2 760 000R       Firm's EBIT 10 060 000R      
Deal 6
Deal 9 Deal 10
Deal 5




Moody’s rating categories explained 
The below graphics was sourced from the 2011 report of The Standing Committee on 
Ratings Systems & Practices of the Moody’s Corporation. It represents the most current 
definitions and guidelines used by Moody’s to conduct analysis and provide credit 
opinions.  
Below are the descriptions of their ratings in descending order. They outline the general 
credit opinion of obligors who would receive such ratings 
 
The graphic below indicates the corporate families, or investment group/holdings, and 
the Basel Committee’s Probabilities of Default (“PD”) associated with their respective 
Moody’s rating; it has been summarized to indicate only the ratings attainable using the 
proposed credit analysis model- the best being the sovereign rating of SA being Baa2. 
II 
 
The ratings commensurate with particular Moody’s credit ratings are provided below.  
The Basel Committee’s Internal Ratings Based approach allows for bespoke but rational 
and prudently developed methodologies to calculate risk metrics and default 
probabilities provided they’re based on sound principles- this has been expanded upon 
in the research methodology in the main body. What is described as the PD for the sake 
of conforming to Moody’s ratings policy has been referred to as PDR in the research 
methodology and analysis- this owing to the stringent nature of PD calculations, sampling, 
testing and validating. 
           
Investment grade High yield speculative grade Highly speculative Substantial Risk-  
Rating Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Ca C 
PD 0.42% 0.71% 1.21% 2.12% 3.76% 6.82% 12.61% 12.62% to 23.8% 





Simulated sample tranaction name Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 3 Deal 4 Deal 5 Deal 6 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 9 Deal 10
Total development cost 64 740 000R           64 140 000R           66 000 000R           66 270 000R           65 310 000R           61 534 000R           65 025 000R           65 595 000R           66 675 000R           66 180 000R           
Borrowers equity (28% of cost) 18 127 200R           16 035 000R           16 500 000R           23 194 500R           14 368 200R           18 460 200R           16 256 250R           14 430 900R           16 668 750R           13 236 000R           
Secured senior loan 46 612 800R           48 105 000R           49 500 000R           43 075 500R           50 941 800R           43 073 800R           48 768 750R           51 164 100R           50 006 250R           52 944 000R           
Net income yield 6,7% 6,2% 7,4% 7,2% 6,2% 6,8% 7,5% 7,2% 6,5% 8,5%
Capitalisation rate 11% 11,25% 10,50% 10,75% 11,25% 10,75% 10,25% 10,50% 10,50% 9,75%
LTV with property cap rate of 61,2% 64,8% 61,7% 55,0% 68,7% 55,2% 58,9% 63,6% 61,9% 60,8%
Interest cover ratio 1,78 1,69 1,66 1,91 1,56 1,90 1,70 1,57 1,66 1,56
Developer's direct experience 8years 4years 12years 5years 2years 8years 8years 5years 3years 11years
Firm's L-T assets 90 250 000R           57 050 000R           98 770 000R           138 910 000R         54 110 000R           84 730 000R           97 600 000R           77 050 000R           60 030 000R           100 630 000R         
Firm's S-T assets 8 150 000R              5 590 000R              10 070 000R           19 940 000R           8 340 000R              11 720 000R           10 850 000R           11 400 000R           6 580 000R              26 120 000R           
Total assets 98 400 000R           62 640 000R           108 840 000R         158 850 000R         62 450 000R           96 450 000R           108 450 000R         88 450 000R           66 610 000R           126 750 000R         
Firm's L-T liabilities 52 800 000R           31 680 000R           69 400 000R           107 400 000R         36 400 000R           65 000 000R           55 450 000R           65 000 000R           35 000 000R           63 400 000R           
Firm's S-T liabilities 3 830 000R              1 398 000R              5 160 000R              10 050 000R           3 035 000R              7 535 000R              5 535 000R              7 535 000R              3 335 000R              7 535 000R              
Total liabilities 56 630 000R           33 078 000R           74 560 000R           117 450 000R         39 435 000R           72 535 000R           60 985 000R           72 535 000R           38 335 000R           70 935 000R           
Equity (retained inome + issued 
capital) 41 770 000R           29 562 000R           34 280 000R           41 400 000R           23 015 000R           23 915 000R           47 465 000R           15 915 000R           28 275 000R           55 815 000R           
Firm's Annual Revenue 12 350 000R           7 410 000R              17 850 000R           19 350 000R           6 990 000R              7 590 000R              7 590 000R              7 590 000R              6 590 000R              19 590 000R           
Firm's EBIT 4 640 000R              2 784 000R              7 760 000R              9 890 000R              1 890 000R              7 060 000R              7 060 000R              7 060 000R              2 760 000R              10 060 000R           
Variable 1 (LTV) (rounded to next whole number)2 2 2 4 1 4 3 2 2 2
Value of score -5 -5 -5 5 -10 5 0 -5 -5 -5
Variable 2 ( Quality of Roads) 3 3 3 3 5 4 2 3 4 3
Value of score 0 0 0 0 10 5 -5 0 5 0
metric 3 ( Quality of Service delivery) 3 3 3 3 5 3 2 3 4 3
Value of score 0 0 0 0 10 0 -5 0 5 0
Variable 4 (Bid-rent value) 3 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 4
Value of score 0 5 5 5 10 5 0 5 0 5
Variable 6 (Qual. of improvements to land) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Value of score 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Aggregate property risk score 0,00 1,00 1,00 3,00 5,00 4,00 -1,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
βᴀ Xᴀᵢ  (where βᴀ=0,2) 17,30% 16,72% 16,72% 15,62% 14,58% 15,09% 17,89% 16,72% 16,16% 16,72%
ICR score 4 3 3 5 3 5 4 2 3 2
Developer Experience Score 4 3 5 3 2 4 4 3 3 5
4,00 3,00 4,33 3,67 2,33 4,33 4,00 2,67 3,00 4,00
βᴃ Xᴃᵢ  (where βᴃ=0,65) 15,09% 15,62% 14,92% 15,26% 15,98% 14,92% 15,09% 15,80% 15,62% 15,09%
Altman's Z"-Score (z one-tail) 2,11 2,31 1,82 1,85 1,83 1,85 2,51 1,72 2,16 3,04
Default probablity 0,98 0,99 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,99 0,96 0,98 0,999
Propability of default (1- P-
Value) = βᴄ Xᴄᵢ  (where 1,74% 1,04% 3,44% 3,22% 3,36% 3,22% 0,60% 4,27% 1,54% 0,12%
PDR 0,1353 0,1365 0,1356 0,1353 0,1381 0,1320 0,1348 0,1425 0,1362 0,1317
Model rank 4 8 6 5 9 2 3 10 7 1
Ordinal consensus rank (from expert panel) 6 7 1 8 10 2 4 5 9 3
Sprearman's correlation (rho=ρ) 0,55151515
MODEL VALIDATION
Simulated sample tranaction name Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 3 Deal 4 Deal 5 Deal 6 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 9 Deal 10
Ordinal consensus rank (independent 
v. ) 6 7 1 8 10 2 4 5 9 3
Model rank (dependant v .) 4 8 6 5 9 2 3 10 7 1
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA on ranks (Kruskal-Wallis H-Test)
Deal 1 Deal 2 Deal 3 Deal 4 Deal 5 Deal 6 Deal 7 Deal 8 Deal 9 Deal 10 TOTAL
median 5 7,5 3,5 6,5 9,5 2 3,5 7,5 8 2
rank sum 19 29 13 25 37 7 13 29 31 7
count 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 20
































































































5 0<x ≤0,3 0<x ≤0,3 0<x ≤0,45
4 0,3<x≤0,4 0,3<x≤0,35 0,45<x≤0,6
3 0,4<x≤0,5 0,35<x≤0,4 0,6<x≤0,75
2 0,5<x≤0,6 0,4<x≤0,45 0,75<x≤0,9




 PDR Calibration for Property and cash Flow Risks 
𝑃𝐷𝑅 =
1
1 + 𝑒(𝑎+𝑏 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)
 
The parameters a and b must be calibrated. This is done by solving the simultaneous 
equation where the upper bound is “a” and lower bound is “b”. 
 
The parameters are calibrated between the absolute minimum default probability 
achievable, which is the Basel II Probability of Default rating that corresponds to one 
notch above the Moody’s sovereign rating for the Republic of South Africa- being Baa3 
and therefore a PD of 0.42%. This is because the Baa2 sovereign rating of RSA represents 
the “risk-free” credit rating of any indigenous credit transaction and not singular 
transaction should equal the risk-free rate. The maximum default probability achievable 
in the Moody’s rating scale is 28.3% which represents the worst risk category, being a C 
rating.  To solve the two parameters, the following is necessary: 
1) Minimum possible PDR = maximum score (lowest risk attributable to highest score) 
2) Maximum possible PDR = minimum score (highest risk attributable to lowest score) 
The calibration is therefore done as follows: 
1) 
𝑃𝐷𝑅(1):        0.0042 =
1
1 + 𝑒(𝑎+𝑏 x 10)
 
2) 
𝑃𝐷𝑅(2):     0.238 =
1
1 + 𝑒(𝑎+𝑏 x (−10))
 
 
The simultaneous equation can then be solved by means of substitution, whereby: 
3) Equation 1 is calculated and rearranged to make variable “a” the subject: 
4) The simultaneous equation is solved by making b the only unknown variable and 
therefore the result of this calibration yield is the following for the a and b values  
Substitution yields 𝑎 = −1.9718 + 10𝑏   for solving the PD calibration equation 
1
1+𝑒(𝑎+𝑏 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)
 . The result for a and b between the parameters 0.01222min and 




Appendix A  
Basel Committee’s Internal Ratings-Based Approach 
The three factors mentioned below correspond to the risk parameters upon which the 
Basel II IRB approach is built: 
• probability of default (PD) per rating grade, which gives the average percentage of 
obligors that default in this rating grade in the course of one year 
• exposure at default (EAD), which gives an estimate of the amount outstanding (drawn 
amounts plus likely future drawdowns of yet undrawn lines) in case the borrower 
defaults 
• loss given default (LGD), which gives the percentage of exposure the bank might lose 
in case the borrower defaults. These losses are usually shown as a percentage 
 
The IRB approach is based on measures of unexpected losses (UL) and expected losses 
(EL). The risk-weight functions produce capital requirements for the UL portion. 
Expected losses are treated separately, as outlined in paragraph 43 and Section III.G. 
In this section, the asset classes are defined first. Adoption of the IRB approach across all 
asset classes is also discussed early in this section, as are transitional arrangements.  
The risk components, each of which is defined later in this section, serve as inputs to the 
risk-weight functions that have been developed for separate asset classes. For example, 
there is a risk-weight function for corporate exposures and another one for qualifying 
revolving retail exposures.  
The treatment of each asset class begins with a presentation of the relevant risk-weight 
function(s) followed by the risk components and other relevant factors, such as the 
treatment of credit risk mitigants.  
The minimum requirements that banks must satisfy to use the IRB approach are 
presented: 
A bank needs to have a credible, transparent, well-documented and verifiable approach 
for weighting these fundamental elements in its overall operational risk measurement 
system. For example, there may be cases where estimates of the 99.9th percentile 
confidence interval based primarily on internal and external loss event data would be 
unreliable for business lines with a heavy-tailed loss distribution and a small number of 
observed losses. In such cases, scenario analysis, and business environment and control 
factors, may play a more dominant role in the risk measurement system. Conversely, 
II 
 
operational loss event data may play a more dominant role in the risk measurement 
system for business lines where estimates of the 99.9th percentile confidence interval 
based primarily on such data are deemed reliable. In all cases, the bank's approach for 
weighting the four fundamental elements should be internally consistent and avoid the 
double counting of qualitative assessments or risk mitigants already recognised in other 
elements of the framework. 
 
Given the continuing evolution of analytical approaches for operational risk, the 
Committee is not specifying the approach or distributional assumptions used to generate 
the operational risk measure for regulatory capital purposes. However, a bank must be 
able to demonstrate that its approach captures potentially severe ‘tail’ loss events. 
Whatever approach is used, a bank must demonstrate that its operational risk measure 
meets a soundness standard comparable to that of the internal ratings-based approach 
for credit risk, (i.e. comparable to a one year holding period and a 99.9th percentile 
confidence interval). 
 
The risk weight used to convert holdings [transactions] into risk-weighted equivalent 
assets would be calculated by multiplying the derived capital charge by the inverse of the 
minimum 8% [or calibrated/calculated PD] calculated risk-based capital requirement. 
Capital charges calculated under the internal models’ method may be no less than the 
capital charges that would be calculated under the simple risk weight method using a 
200% risk weight for publicly traded equity holdings and a 300% risk weight for all other 
equity holdings. These minimum capital charges would be calculated separately using the 
methodology of the simple risk weight approach. Further, these minimum 
 
A bank using a VaR model will be required to back-test its output using a sample of 20 
counterparties, identified on an annual basis. These counterparties should include the 10 
largest as determined by the bank according to its own exposure measurement approach 
and 10 others selected at random. For each day and for the sample of 20 counterparties, 
the bank must compare the previous day’s VaR estimate for the counterparty portfolio to 
the change in the exposure of the previous day’s portfolio. This change is the difference 
between the net value of the previous day’s portfolio using today’s market prices and the 
net value of that portfolio using the previous day’s market prices. Where this difference 
exceeds the previous day’s VaR estimate, an exception has occurred. Depending on the 
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number of exceptions in the observations for the 20 counterparties over the most recent 
250 days (encompassing 5000 observations). 
 
Given the data limitations associated with Secured Lending (“SL”) exposures, a bank may 
remain on the supervisory slotting criteria approach for one or more of the IPRE or 
HVCRE sub-classes, and move to the foundation or advanced approach for other sub-
classes within the corporate asset class. However, a bank should not move to the 
advanced approach for the HVCRE sub-class without also doing so for material IPRE 
exposures at the same time. 
 
Foundation and advanced approaches 
For each of the asset classes covered under the IRB framework, there are three key 
elements: 
• Risk components ─ estimates of risk parameters provided by banks some of which 
are supervisory estimates. 
• Risk-weight functions ─ the means by which risk components are transformed into 
risk-weighted assets and therefore capital requirements. 
• Minimum requirements ─ the minimum standards that must be met in order for a 
bank to use the IRB approach for a given asset class. 
For many of the asset classes, the Committee has made available two broad approaches: 
a foundation and an advanced. Under the foundation approach, as a general rule, banks 
provide their own estimates of PD and rely on supervisory estimates for other risk 
components. 
The foundation IRB approach shall, when appropriate, such as in the case of material 
differences, further decompose the said information and provide an analysis of PD ratios 
and reasons for material differences. 
 Under the advanced approach, banks provide more of their own estimates of PD, LGD 
and EAD, and their own calculation of M, subject to meeting minimum standards. For both 
the foundation and advanced approaches, banks must always use the risk-weight 
functions provided in this Framework for the purpose of deriving capital requirements. 















 b) Maturity adjustment (b) = (0.11852 – 0.05478 × ln (PD))^2 
 
Reporting under the Foundation Approach  
A detailed comprehension of the risk reports generated by the risk system, including 
information relating to-  
(i) the relevant internal ratings; 
(ii) the bank's risk profile based on risk grades; 
(iii) risk migration across risk grades; 
(iv) the relevant risk estimates of the relevant parameters per risk grade; 
(v) a comparison between realised and expected PD ratios, LGD ratios and EAD 
amount 
Claims secured by commercial real estate 
74. In view of the experience in numerous countries that commercial property lending 
has been a recurring cause of troubled assets in the banking industry over the past few 
decades, the Committee holds to the view that mortgages on commercial real estate do 
not, in principle, justify other than a 100% weighting of the loans secured. [Where 
Foundation approach needs help, there are supervisory slots available for specialised 
lending- these are the risk weights.] 
 
Risk weights for High Volatility Commercial Real Estate 0”(HVCRE”) 
Banks that do not meet the requirements for estimation of PD, or whose supervisor has 
chosen not to implement the foundation or advanced approaches to HVCRE, must map 
their internal grades to five supervisory categories, each of which is associated with a 
specific risk weight. The slotting criteria on which this mapping must be based are the 
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same as those for IPRE, as provided in Annex 4. The risk weights associated with each 
category are: 
Supervisory categories and Unexpected Loss risk weights for high-volatility commercial 
real estate 
Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default 
95% 120% 140% 250% 0% 
 
Although banks are expected to map their internal ratings to the supervisory categories 
for specialised lending using the slotting criteria provided in Annex 4, each supervisory 
category broadly corresponds to a range of external credit assessments as outlined below. 
Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default 
BBB- (or better) BB+ or BB BB- or B+ B to C- N/A 
 
Basel II Risk Components 
 
PD- the one-year percentage of predicted default probability, calculated by means of a 
recognised and mathematically sound methodology. Under the foundation approach the 
bank is able to calculate their own PD using their own back-data. 
 
LGD- Under the foundation approach, senior claims on corporates, sovereigns and banks 
not secured by recognised collateral will be assigned a 45% LGD. 
All subordinated claims on corporates, sovereigns and banks will be assigned a 75% LGD. 
A subordinated loan is a facility that is expressly subordinated to another facility. At 
national discretion, supervisors may choose to employ a wider definition of 
subordination. This might include economic subordination, such as cases where the 
facility is unsecured and the bulk of the borrower’s assets are used to secure other 
exposures. 
 
Collateral under the foundation approach 
In addition to the eligible financial collateral recognised in the standardised approach, 
under the foundation IRB approach some other forms of collateral, known as eligible IRB 
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collateral, are also recognised. These include receivables, specified commercial and 
residential real estate (CRE/RRE). 
 
All documentation used in collateralised transactions and for documenting on- balance 
sheet netting, guarantees and credit derivatives must be binding on all parties and legally 
enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. Banks must have conducted sufficient legal 
review to verify this and have a well-founded legal basis to reach this conclusion, and 
undertake such further review as necessary to ensure continuing enforceability. [In South 
Africa this would be ensuring a valid secured lending contract is signed and that a 
mortgage bond is successfully registered over the subject asset.] 
Overview of Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques for Collateralised transactions: 
A collateralised transaction is one in which: 
1. banks have a credit exposure or potential credit exposure; and 
2. that credit exposure or potential credit exposure is hedged in whole or in part by 
collateral posted by a counterparty or by a third party on behalf of the counterparty. 
 
Under Basel II, capital is set to maintain a supervisory fixed confidence level [this CI is 
99.9% and represents an appropriate significance level for calculating adequate bank 
capital reserving because of the magnitude and volatility that lies in bank credit portfolios. 
The academic nature, however, of this research will set the CI at 95% as it seeks to 
appropriately calculate the Risk-weighted asset of a greenfileds affordable housing 
development in any of the Metropolitan cities of Gauteng Province and does not take into 
account capital reserving nor an existing credit portfolio by the lender and the hurdle 
return rates and risks therein] 
 
Banks may include statistical models and mechanical methods to assign borrower and 
facility ratings or estimate PD ratios, LGD ratios and EAD amounts, which models and 
methods- 
(i) shall take into account all relevant and material information; 
(ii) shall be used appropriately; 
(iii) shall have good predictive power; 
(iv) shall incorporate a reasonable set of risk predictors and the bank shall have in place 




(v) shall be materially accurate across a range of borrowers or facilities; 
(vi) shall not contain any known material biases; 
(vii) shall be subject to a regular validation process of data inputs, including an 
assessment of accuracy, completeness and appropriateness; 
(viii) shall be subject to written policies and procedures for human review and judgement, 
provided that when human judgement is used to override the model's output, the bank 
shall separately keep track of the performance of the relevant exposure; 
(ix) Shall be subject to regular back-testing. 
 
As a minimum, a bank that adopted the IRB approach- shall in the case of exposures 
relating to SL, which exposures were mapped into the standardised rating categories 
specified in paragraph (d)(iii)(C) below, have no less than four borrower grades in 
respect of borrowers that are not in default and one grade for borrowers that have 
defaulted; 
(iii) shall assign a rating to each obligor and all eligible guarantors, which rating shall be 
reviewed or approved by a person who does not directly benefit from the extension of 
credit; 
(iv) shall associate each exposure with a facility rating as part of the loan approval 
process; 
(vi) shall review assigned borrower and facility ratings on a regular basis, but not less 
frequently than once a year, provided that the bank shall review all relevant 
ratings as soon as material new information comes to the attention of the bank; 
(vii) shall have in place an effective process in order to obtain and update all relevant 
information 
The model specification was subject to an important restriction in order to fit supervisory 
needs: The model should be portfolio invariant, i.e. the capital required for any given loan 
should only depend on the risk of that loan and must not depend on the portfolio it is 
added to. Taking into account the actual portfolio composition when determining capital 
for each loan - as is done in more advanced credit portfolio models- would have been a 
too complex task for most banks and supervisors alike. Portfolio invariant allocation 
schemes are also called ratings-based. (Bank of International Settlements, 2004) 
 
